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ABSTRACT 
Several studies (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900; Weber 1946; Holcombe and Gwarteny 1989; 
Rahman 2014; Muhdiarta, Haning, and Ahmad 2017; Dasandi, and Esteve 2017, etc.)  show 
that politicization of the bureaucracy is on the increase globally and as such these studies have 
been devoted to analysing the causes and impact of politicization on the bureaucracy. Such 
involvement in the appointments and functioning of the bureaucracy has been argued to be at 
the centre of controversies in the poor performance, mismanagement, and maladministration 
of government institutions. Politicization and political control of the bureaucracy have been 
primarily studied; the generally held perspective that the bureaucracy's politicization is at the 
core of public sector corruption, service delivery backlogs, governance and administrative 
failures, lack of accountability and transparency, and poor financial management.  
Aside from South Africa's transition to democracy that is globally respected without a 
revolution, the country also inherited a racially politicalized bureaucracy. As part of 
transformation, reform, and gaining political control over the bureaucracy, the African National 
Congress government established the cadre deployment policy as an instrument for party 
loyalists to occupy prominent positions in the sector. While the politicization and political 
control of the bureaucracy is a global phenomenon and is believed to be the cause of state 
maladministration, this study attempted to gain some insight into the reasons and causes for 
the politicization of the appointments and functioning municipal managers in South Africa by 
political parties. The study also explored the impact on political-bureaucratic relations in the 
metro municipalities in South Africa, focusing on metros that are highly politically unstable, 
and such instability directly impacts the role and functioning municipal managers. 
The study provided a historical perspective on the development of the local government, and 
the reviewed literature revealed that the politicization and political control of key officials in 
the local government has a long history in South Africa. The study drew from the literature on 
the Dichotomous and the Inseparable Political-Bureaucratic relationship theories in 
conceptualizing and analysing political parties' involvement in the bureaucracy's politicization 
and political control. The focus of the theories is on municipal managers' influencing 
functioning, especially in the awarding of tenders and the appointment of municipal staff. The 
use of political-bureaucratic relationship theories in exploring theoretical perspectives within 
the field of political sciences and public governance underpins the relationship between 
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political parties and politicians representing the political in government and the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats.  
The study found a significant connection between the politicization of appointments as rewards 
for loyal supporters using the qualitative research approach and secondary literature. The study 
also found that there was also a significant correlation between the bureaucracy's politicization 
and poor municipal performance, corruption, and maladministration. Further to this, political 
contestations and in-fighting also impact the appointments and functioning of municipal 
managers. As the study was limited to a desktop analysis, it is recommended that further 
empirical study should be undertaken on the politicization and political control of government 
institutions in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study's primary objectives and focus are to shed light on the nature and extent of 
politicization on the appointments and function of municipal managers with the South African 
local government sphere. This chapter discusses the study's introduction and background, the 
problem statement and scope of the study, the purpose and significance of the study, the 
research objectives as well as the research questions, and the conceptualization of key terms 
and structure of the study. 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The issue of politicization of bureaucracies has been at the centre of controversies in 
government institutions' mismanagement and maladministration. As such, political scientists 
and public governance scholars have become increasingly interested in the manner and extent 
of the influence of politicians and political parties and the use of political control mechanisms 
in the appointments and functioning of the bureaucracy. The actions of politicians and political 
parties that are mentioned are an enduring phenomenon and challenge internationally. 
Those who practice the politicization of bureaucracies are often sighted to use undemocratic 
and inimical practices to appoint government officials that are politically preferred (Kopecký 
et al. 2016:416). The practice is also viewed as political patronage through rewarding loyal 
members' positions in the bureaucracy: in most cases, this is viewed as a key obstacle to the 
social, political, and economic development of states. Thus, the argument is that politicization 
produces poor quality and poor performing state institutions; it also promotes public sector 
corruption and the government institutions' micro-management by politicians or political 
parties (Ban 2014:3).  
Hence, various studies have looked at the politicization of the bureaucracy and the 
appropriateness of the relationship between politicians and public servants: differing views 
have emerged on the bureaucracy's politicization. Most of the studies advocate for the 
neutrality and separate operation of the bureaucracy, and the others call for the involvement of 
politicians in the function and operation of the bureaucracy.  
This study takes a similar approach by seeking to add to the scholarly debate on having either 
having politicized or depoliticized bureaucracies to enhance government functioning.  
2 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
Thus, the study seeks to explore and discuss the mechanisms used by political party structures 
in the politicization and political control of municipal managers and other senior staff; and how 
such politicization impacts the political-bureaucratic relations and the functioning of 
municipalities. Furthermore, this research intends to focus on how political parties' 
involvement impacts the political and administrative stability of municipalities. Secondly, the 
challenges of municipal maladministration, mismanagement of funds, corruption, municipal 
in-fighting, and poor service delivery are linked to the bureaucracy's politicization are also the 
focus of the study.  
The study, therefore, attempts to look at the practices of politicizing the municipal 
bureaucracies within the South African local government sphere. Since politicizing the 
bureaucracy is based chiefly on appointing politically suitable candidates rather than merit, the 
practice has been viewed negatively (Booysen 2017:333). The study further presents a 
discussion on both the negatives and positives linked with the practice of politicizing the 
bureaucracy, focusing on the South African local government sphere. As such, the study seeks 
to contribute to the body literature that explores the various mechanisms that political parties 
use to control state capacity, through the politicization of the bureaucracy by either cadre 
deployment or political appointment of managers that are loyal to the political party, and also 
influencing administrative and political decisions. 
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
As part of the study's contribution to the body of literature, the study employs the Dichotomous 
and Separate Relationship Theory and the Inseparable Relationship Theory as theories that 
address politicization and the practices of political control on the bureaucracy. Based on the 
theories, the study specifically explores the politicization of the bureaucracy in the South 
African local government sphere and its contribution to the existing challenges in the sphere. 
Since political parties' involvement in the politicization and political control over the political 
government and the bureaucracy provides a different dimension on the practice. The study uses 
the Politicised-bureaucracy model to analyse political parties' role and behavior in the 
politicization of the bureaucracy.   
The aim is to assess the political control practices of the ruling political parties within 
municipalities concerning senior municipal officials' appointments and functions: by exploring 
whether the bureaucracy's politicization is the right approach to improve service delivery and 
the relations between politicians and municipal officials. The study will use existing literature 
to apply the conceptual knowledge of this study; as part of adding to the scholarly debate 
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around politicization and political-bureaucratic relations and also to recommend the ideal role 
that political parties can play in the development of competent and efficient local government 
bureaucracy, and the strengthen political-bureaucratic relations within municipalities. 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
According to Rhodes (1996), the relationship between government officials and the political 
government (politicians) has been a frequent source of tension. To limit such tension, the 
political parties in various countries have exercised several strategies to control government 
officials' appointments. In the ideal conception, these political parties want a politically suitable 
bureaucracy: that can administratively suppress opposition parties, develop and implement 
policies and programs that are pro-political-party, and ensure smooth working relations with 
the political principals. Thus, supporters of this perspective advocate for the bureaucracy's 
politicization and the strengthening of political control by political actors. Reddy (2016) 
concurs and argues that "that ruling parties politicized the bureaucracy to ensure that the 
political and administrative leadership share the same political ideology and vision to facilitate 
the policies and service delivery" (Reddy 2016: 338).  
Booysen (2017) further points out that such is South Africa's case; it is the ruling parties in 
most municipalities that influence senior municipal managers' appointments. She also 
acknowledged that while the African National Congress leads in most municipalities, it is not 
the only political party that practices politicization and political control (Booysen 2017:364). 
Cameron (2003) concurs by pointing out that the Inkatha Freedom Party and Democratic 
Alliance also use the same strategy in the municipalities they lead. However, the challenge 
with the bureaucracy's politicization has received several criticisms and has been linked with 
several failures in the local government sphere (Cameron 2003:51). 
Hence, one of the criticisms against the bureaucracy's politicization is the consistent 
diminishing interface between the administrative management, political leadership, and the 
ruling party (Muhdiarta et al. 2017: 794). Also, there is a lack of a clear distinction and 
separation between the political party as an organization and the political party in government. 
Such a lack of a clear separation can destabilize or undermine the legitimacy and functioning 
of municipalities and has been linked to the multifaceted challenges that confront the local 
government sphere. 
 Part of the challenges linked to the challenges is the incompetence and disorganization of the 
senior managers, lack of accountability and transparency, skill shortages and drain, corruption, 
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and maladministration (Koma and Kuye 2014:95). De Visser et al. (2009) further points out 
that most of the appointments made on political suitability rather than skills, knowledge, 
qualification, and experience; and such appoints are linked with the challenges of service 
delivery backlogs, leadership and governance failures, corruption, and fraud, poor financial 
management, and poor performance management. 
 As such, this study seeks to analyze the nature of politicization and the interactions between 
political parties, politicians, and senior municipal officials within the local government sphere. 
The aim is to investigate the methods and mechanisms used by political parties to influence 
municipal officials' appointments and the relationship between politicians and municipal 
officials. Also, part of the study's task is to look at the clash and interface of the values, roles, 
and interests of political parties, politicians in governance, and the municipal leaders. 
Therefore, to improve service delivery and the local government sphere's functioning, the study 
proposes the need to reconcile that the clash of interest and roles between bureaucrats, 
politicians, and political parties through the assessment of political party influence in the 
political-bureaucratic relations and the function of municipalities. Thus, the study seeks to posit 
remedies that could improve the local government sphere and consequently reduce the 
bureaucracy's politicization with little consideration of the senior municipal managers' needed 
skills, expertise, and experience. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
As perceived, politicization presents several challenges and problems to effective functioning 
and service provision in most municipalities. Several challenges are suggested to be caused by 
politicization and politicized political-bureaucratic relations: all these challenges cannot be 
addressed in one research. Furthermore, not much research has focused on the politicization of 
the government in South Africa. Most of the limited research has focused on the politicization 
of the political positions in government departments, focusing on the politicization of the 
appointment of senior government officials such as Directors-General, Deputy Directors-
General, and Heads of Departments.  
What is important is that not much research has focused on the politicization of the local 
government administration positions; especially, on the direct involvement of political parties 
in the political control of the municipal administrations. Thus, this study's significance is to 
explore the nature of the involvement of politicians and political parties in the local government 
sphere within the scope of the theories that the study used. Furthermore, to explore and analyze 
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the impact of the involvement on the political-bureaucratic relations; especially, the challenges 
that plague the sphere linked with the politicization of the bureaucracy and how to improve on 
the effective delivery of services within the sphere through political-bureaucratic relations.  
Based on the literature on politicization and the political control of municipal managers' 
appointments and functioning in the South African local government sphere, especially in the 
used cases of the metro municipalities. The researcher will be in a better position to recommend 
which approach should on the political-bureaucratic relations. As the focus of the study is 
aimed at improving the functioning and the performance of the local government sphere across 
the country; thus, by addressing the relations between the governing political parties in 
municipalities and between the municipal politicians and the municipal officials, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of municipalities can improve.  
More importantly, as the study looked at the role of political parties in the politicization of the 
bureaucracy and the political-bureaucratic relations, the study also reflected on the gaps and 
challenges that impede the effective and efficient functioning of the local government sphere. 
Thus, through the realization of the study's aims, the study seeks to add value to the existing 
body of literature on the aspects of improving service delivery, good governance and 
administration, and the improvement in the quality of appointed municipal officials. 
1.6 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to provide an in-depth insight into municipal managers' politicization in the 
South African local government. Instead of the provincial or national government sphere, the 
focus on the local government sphere is based on the fact that it is the sphere of government 
that foot soldier of government that is closest to the people. Therefore, it is generally viewed 
as the implementing agent by the people, and whenever citizens are aggrieved by poor service 
delivery that protest to the municipality or ward regardless of the nature of services. 
Furthermore, it is the only sphere of government that is intrinsically multi-sectorial: with the 
mandate to bring together a variety of sectoral issues based on citizen demands, provincial and 
national government policy, programs, or projects (Atkinson 2002).  
Therefore, the key mandate of local government through municipalities is to provide a decent 
quality of life and restoring communities' social and economic aspirations: this is the 
foundation for building a democratic, integrated, prosperous, and non-racial society (Ngcobo 
2012: 20). Thus, focus on the involvement of political parties in politicization and the political 
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control of municipal managers' appointments and administrative functioning is aimed at 
improving the performance of the sphere. 
In discussing the politicization and the political-bureaucratic relations, the study aims to 
improve the local government sphere; especially, in the provision of quality services, 
decreasing service delivery protest, and improving good governance and political stability in 
municipalities. 
In conducting the study, the researcher will be guided by the following objectives:  
1. To gain an understanding of politicized bureaucracy that is contextual to the involvement of 
political parties  
2. To explore theoretical perspectives within the field of political sciences and public 
governance which underpin the relationship between political parties and politicians 
representing the political in government; the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats;  
3. To determine the role played by political deployment or political appointments concerning 
the challenges in local government  
4. To look at the possibility of establishing an ideal model that can serve as a vital tool for 
improving service delivery and leadership quality. 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTION  
As already mentioned, the available literature on the topic has predominantly focused on the 
role and influence of political parties on members' deployment and function in political 
administration positions such as the mayor, municipal executive committee, municipal council, 
municipal speaker, etc. Not much research has focused on the politicization of the South 
African local government sphere; or the analysis of the relationship between politicians, the 
senior managers, and the political parties.  
With several challenges that exist in the local government sphere that is linked to the 
politicization of the bureaucracy, this study aims to contribute to the growing knowledge body 
within the field of political sciences and, to some extent, public governance on politicized 
bureaucracies and the models that can be used to examine the relationships. Thus, the research 
plans to addresses the following questions:  
1. In what way do the political-bureaucratic relation theories allow for political parties' 
involvement in the political-bureaucratic relationship? 
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2. What are the interest and reasons for the political parties' politicization of municipal 
manager's positions or the political government?  
3. To what extent is the politicization perceived to affect service delivery's quality, efficiency, 
and effectiveness? 
4. How can municipal efficiency be improved with the proper utilization of politicization of 
the bureaucracy or the creation of politically neutral bureaucracy? 
1.8 THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY TERMS 
This part defines key concepts essential to understanding better the politicization of the 
bureaucracy and political- bureaucratic relations. 
1.8.1 Politics  
The term `politics' has no generic definition and has many meanings to different people; 
however, ancient Greek scholars such as Socrates and Aristotle defined the term as the 'Master 
of Science,' which aims to make citizens happy. At the heart of politics the creation of a 
governing institution; thus, scholars such as Weber (1946), Locke (1689), Dahl (1947), and 
Heywood (2002) have defined it as the 'art or science of governing,' which consist of the 
distribution of resources and exercise of power. Weber (1946) further added by characterizing 
politics as a struggle for power to control public affairs and the use of various means to maintain 
power.  
Since the term politics cannot be separated from the use of power, Dahl (1947) also argued that 
power through politics is at the core of modern state political systems with the control, the 
influence, or authority over the human relationship in a state. Heywood also adds in support to 
Dahl, "that at the heart of politics are the debate, argument, and disagreement, this he links to 
the principles of conflict and cooperation at the heart of politics (Heywood 2017:58)." 
Heywood concludes that politics practiced in all social settings and institutions, which he 
breaks down into four categories when it comes to governance: "politics as the art of 
government; politics as public affairs; politics as compromise and consensus; and politics as 
power and the distribution of resources (Heywood 2017: 58). 
On the other hand, Rahman (2015) viewed politics as "a power game and the politicians are 
the main actors or players in the power game." He further expressed the view that politics is 
about governance, with the politicians exercising state power on how the people are ruled and 
administering and regulating the affairs of the state (Rahman 2015:28). Hanekom et al. (1990) 
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referred to politics as the "aspiration for or retention of power over a jurisdictional area and its 
inhabitants by individuals or groups of individuals, inherent in which is the authoritative 
allocation of values in order to regulate or accommodate conflict within the community 
concerned (Hanekom et al.1990:126-127)." This study assumes that the group referred to are 
political parties made up of politicians who in most democratic states contest for state power. 
In relation to the political and electoral system used in South Africa, political parties contest 
for power and govern through their elected members; even at local government ward councilor 
elections are contested through parties or independent candidates. More importantly, municipal 
council elections are contested through the proportional electoral system and based on the seats 
won; the municipal council is elected through political party representation. This government 
system views political parties as key actors in the contestation to access, retain and exercise 
power. 
1.8.2 Bureaucracy 
Krause and Meier (2005) argue that the study of bureaucracy within political science is as 
ancient as the study of politics. The literature on the bureaucracy dates back to the great empires 
and civilizations of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Roma (Farazmand, 
2009: 2-3). As such, these ancient civilizations considered the bureaucracy" as a state apparatus 
that is involved in law and order maintenance, policy implementation of developmental and 
monumental works (Rahman 2015:29). The bureaucrats were the scribers who interpreted the 
law and governed over the harvest and the allocation.  
Kenneth Thompson (1970) argues that while bureaucrats' role and function developed with the 
advancement of civilizations, the English thought that the word 'bureaucratic' was a French 
'disease.' It was French novelist Balzac Les Employés (1836) writing on the French state 
bureaucracy that provided the needed understanding when he used the French word 
'bureaucratie,' which is a combination of the Word' bureau' which means a desk, office, or 
government department and the Greek word 'Kratos' meaning to rule. Heady, citing Pete Blau, 
explains the bureaucracy compliment the above: referred to the bureaucracy as "organization 
that maximizes efficiency in administration or an institutionalized method of organized social 
conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency" (Heady 2001:73). 
In forming the modern organizational system of governance, the bureaucrats are also referred 
to as administrators or managers. Weber (1947) advocated that the bureaucracy is administered 
professionally, formally, and to be a rational structure of authority with incumbents with a high 
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competency level. Sager and Rosser (2009) share the classical perspective that politics and 
administration are two clear, distinct, and separate spheres. Since politics is concerned with the 
struggle for power and hegemony, policy development is based on political parties' activities 
and the differing opinions and values on governing.  
Thus, the bureaucrats should be politically neutral implementers of policy with expert technical 
competencies. Cameron (2003) concludes that Weber's notion of the bureaucracy's key features 
are professionals selected based on merit and competence rather than political preference.  
This classical notion of the bureaucracy by Weber advocated for the bureaucracy's need to be 
administratively professional in implementing policy and the execution of its other duties while 
being shielded from the political inference. Waldo (1968), differing from Weber on the 
separation and distinction between politics and the bureaucracy, argues that while bureaucrats 
have detailed knowledge and technical expertise, that report to politicians and influence 
policies. He concludes that politicians and bureaucrats need to have a mutual-interactive 
relationship (Waldo 1968:147-152). Since the research is trying to understand the nature of the 
political parties' involvement in the politicization and political control of the appointment and 
function of municipal managers. The study used both the definitions of the bureaucracy as a 
creation by politicians to serve in the implementation of policies: also as professionals with 
expert technical experience and competence that should not be subject to politics.  
1.8.3 Political Control 
According to Moe (2006), it is challenging to study political-bureaucratic relations without 
using political control either as a concept or theory. The term political control refers to the 
means and mechanism to which the political authorities use to control the bureaucrats' 
relationship and function, and he suggests that the relationship can be understood as one of a 
principal and an agent (Moe 2006:3). Now at the heart of the debate around political-
bureaucratic relations is about limiting the political control over the bureaucracy by politicians 
(Bach et al. 2015:3).  
Balla (1998) thus suggests that political control as a concept refers to the dictatorship of 
politicians in the administrative and financial decisions, the policy direction, and the 
distribution of resources. Ban (2014) further adds that the concept fits well when analyzing the 
use of principal-agent relations in governments. Moe (2006) thus concludes that there are 
various methods used to political control the bureaucracy; however, the most known and 
widely practiced strategy is the bureaucracy's politicization. 
10 
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1.8.4 Politicization  
In terms of literature, the term politicization is mainly referred to as the politicization of the 
bureaucracy, yet the terms also apply to the politicization of various institutions such as 
businesses, interest groups, schools and universities, government, etc. Gherghina and Kopecký 
(2016), in support, argue that most of the literature on politicization is on government, 
bureaucracies, political parties, and state institutions. It is worth noting that a growing body of 
literature seeks to analyze and discuss the various methods and means by which government 
institutions are politicized and subjected to political control. 
Politicization is as a result of the influential interest groups or the government of the day 
assuming that for the effective functioning of government and the implementation of policies; 
it needs a civil service that is sympathetic towards the policies of the interest group or 
government, or a civil service that is part of the interest and actively supports the government 
(Cloete et al. 1997:20). With the key interest of the study on the involvement of political parties, 
the takes the approach of viewing politicization as suggested by Gherghina et al. (2016:408) as 
the appointment of party personnel is the intention to reward members for their political 
support, and the gaining control of state institutions of policy implementation (Gherghina and 
Kopecký 2016:408). 
Madumo (2016) defines the bureaucracy's politicization as enforcing politics or giving a 
political tone and character to an institution. A simple way to view politicization is to consider 
the practice as a substitution of the merit criteria in the bureaucracy's appointment and 
functioning with the political criteria. The strategy is to appoint officials in key decision-
making positions to promote overt or implicit the political interest of the political party or the 
government of the day (Cloete et al. 1997:21). Thus, the bureaucracy's politicization mostly 
happens through appointments and career developments of the public officials that are subject 
to the political will of the political party or the political government (Madumo 2016:83). The 
scholar concludes that for such appointments, there has to be indirectly or directly some form 
of political influence, interference, or manipulation that dictates the appointment processes and 
the functioning of those appointed in that particular government institution (Madumo 
2016:83).  
Boräng, Cornell, Grimes, and Schuster (2014) further add that politicization is based on the 
degree to which political agents control the bureaucracy, and the primary way of gaining 
control is through the appointment of members loyal to the party into key positions of decision-
11 
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making and influence. These scholars also conclude that the reasons for the appointments are 
based on political grounds rather than knowledge, skills, and experience (Boräng et al. 2014:6). 
Thus, the study on the politicization of the bureaucracy will provide an insight into the 
challenges and tensions in South African politics between the political control of municipalities 
and the competence; and most importantly, to shed light on the tools and mechanisms used for 
controlling the bureaucracy and the role of political control in the provision of tenders to the 
companies the political parties favour them. 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
Chapter One: Introduction and Problem statement  
This chapter intends to contextualize the research by offering the background and outline of 
the research problem; the research questions, the aims, and the objectives of the study will be 
addressed and set out. The chapter thus also attempts to provide the conceptualization of key 
terms and the structure of the study.  
Chapter Two: Literature review and theoretical framework:  
This chapter looks at the general literature on government bureaucracies' politicization; the 
literature review looks at the various politicization practices from Western states, African 
states, and South Africa. The chapter further provides an in-depth discussion on the 
politicization of the South African local government sphere. More importantly, the chapter 
discusses the theories on political-bureaucratic relations and politicization. Thus the chapter 
discusses the various theories and models that view the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats as either dichotomous or inseparable. 
Chapter Three: Political-Bureaucratic Relations in the South African Local Government 
This chapter considers the perceptions towards the involvement of political parties and the 
challenges in the local government sphere linked to the practice of politicizing the bureaucracy. 
The chapter thus attempts to understand the nature of politicization, political control, and 
political-bureaucratic relations issues in the South African local government sphere; this 
chapter discusses the processes, means, or mechanisms that political parties or the political 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology: 
This chapter presents the research methodology, and the research is a desktop analysis of the 
different dimensions and methods used in the politicization of senior municipal managers in 
the South African local sphere. Since the topic explores the behavioral aspect of political parties 
and the relations between politicians and bureaucracy, the exploratory and descriptive research 
method will be used. Also, through content analysis, the chapter seeks to find a correlation 
between political parties' involvement and municipal performance.  
Chapter Five: Recommendations and Conclusions 
This chapter provides the summary and recommendations that municipalities or the whole local 
government sphere can consider in trying to limit the negative impact of politicization or 
establish a political neutral bureaucracy that is responsive to the political imperatives of the 
political parties based on the party manifesto. The chapter seeks to recommend the alternative 
practices that can be practiced by political parties and the political structures in municipals in 
their relationship with the municipal officials and on how the politicization of the bureaucracy 
can lead to a complementarity functioning of the local government sphere. The aim is to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of local government. 
1.10 CONCLUSION  
In summary, this chapter has provided an introduction and background on the study, with its 
intention to discuss methods and means political parties use to politicize the local government 
bureaucracy and examine the nature of government's political-bureaucratic relations. Part of 
the chapter included identifying the research problem and question, the aims and objectives of 
the study, and the historical background into the development of the local government sphere 
in South Africa. The next chapter will then provide a theoretical framework on the 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the political-bureaucratic relations and the various means of control 
practiced by politicians on the bureaucracy. The chapter expands on the nature of the 
governance, political system, and political parties in the political control over the bureaucracy. 
The chapter also explores the relationship between political control, accountability, and 
responsibility of political office-bearers to political parties; and the nature of interactions 
between the political office-bearers and public officials.  
It is also the purpose of this chapter to provide a general overview nature of the politicization 
of the bureaucracy; the focus is on the factors and institutions that influence the political control 
and the interactions between the bureaucrats and politicians. This is achieved by surveying the 
theoretical literature on political-bureaucratic relations: the chapter focuses on the dichotomous 
relationship theory and the inseparable relationship theory. Through the lens of these theories, 
the chapter looks at the involvement and dominance of political parties on the government's 
political control, especially in the local government sphere. 
 
2.2. Political-bureaucratic relations in Western Democracies 
Most studies on political-bureaucratic relations, politics, and governance are based on western 
democracies, as they are founders of modern democracies and systems. According to Rahman 
(2015), these studies have been key in formulating general assumptions, principles, practices, 
and theories concerning politics and governance. This perspective is also supported by, 
Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981), who argued that western democracies are trendsetters 
on the dilemma between specialization and professionalization of the bureaucracy and political 
control. For years the dilemma of undue political control in western democracies has remained 
a challenge. 
From the above theoretical discussion, it can be said that political parties' role in the political-
bureaucratic relations in government needs to be examined more deeply by political scientists 
and public administration. The different models and the principle-agent theory shape the 
theoretical underpinning on politicization, political control, and the nature of the political-
bureaucratic relations. However, the notable things about the shift from a dichotomous 
relationship to an interface relationship are the challenges of bureaucratic autonomy, 
performance, sound governance, and political control. Scholars such as Blom-Hansen et al. 
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2018, suggest that the most significant challenge that still stands is on how to create the ideally 
balanced model of governance based on the political-bureaucratic relations influence, 
bureaucratic political control, and undue influence of the bureaucracy on the political agenda. 
2.2.1. United States of America 
The United States of America is one of the most studied countries on balancing political control 
and bureaucratic expertise and professional influence on the political agenda (Blom). Thus, 
scholars such as Woodrow Wilson (1887), Goodnow (1900), Max Weber (1947), etc., are 
considered as the pioneering scholars on the political-bureaucratic relations and have used the 
USA as a case study. To better understand the nature of the political- bureaucratic relations, 
we need to understand the American political system, which has the president's executive 
authority; thus, instead of a parliamentary system, it has spoils systems (Peters 2005:149). 
Pfiffner (1987) concludes that the spoils system's function is to ensure the implementation of 
the new president's policies and programs.  
The same political systems apply in states and cities; however, according to Blom-Hansen et 
al. (2018) it is only those that hold the merit-based administrative position for a long tenure are 
considered as bureaucrats or career executives; and those that are most subject to the survival 
of the political principal are considered as political appointees. The USA's presidential system 
enables the president to make over three thousand political appointments in the bureaucracy; 
such politicization of the bureaucracy is suggested to be aimed at having a bureaucracy that is 
an agent of the political agenda of the principal (Stempień 2012:102).  
Pfiffner (1987) believes that whenever new presidents take office, there is always a high level 
of distrust and enmity towards the bureaucrats, and as such, the political appointees serve as 
the agents of the president. Gailmard (2012) suggests that in such a relationship, the political 
appointees aim to have political control over the career executives' functioning, thus making 
them agents of the political principal. Based on the relations between the presidents and the 
bureaucracy, scholars such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Webber advocated for a dichotomous 
relationship. 
2.2.2 France 
In France's context with a Parliamentary system of governance, it has a hybrid model in terms 
of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (Quermonne and Rouban 1986:399). 
Thus, the relationship is more of mutual interaction between politicians and the bureaucrats; 
therefore, the bureaucracy is somehow de-politicized and with reasonable political control 
(Gherghina and Kopecký 2016:410). There is also a high presence and influence of the majority 
political party in the bureaucracy's functioning, through the backing of the Presidents in the 
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parliamentary processes and creating a complementary and politically responsive bureaucracy 
(Rouban 2007:478). Frezza and Goessen (2012) conclude that the politicization of a high 
administrative position in France has become a common rule; however, the appointments are 
based on administrative merits.  
While the United States of America and France have different political systems and have 
different approaches to political-bureaucratic relations, these countries represent the general 
approaches of developing countries on the political-bureaucratic relations. In these countries, 
the political and administrative culture is centered on good governance inspired by the New 
Public Management reforms (Rouban 2007:473). This is supported by Dasandi (2014:11-12) 
analysis on political-bureaucratic relations: that developed countries tend to promote good 
governance through the appointment of civil servants with high technical, managerial, and 
administrative skills, who enjoy more autonomy and less political control; however, in 
developmental and the predatory state the is a shift towards increased politicization that is on 
political loyal rather than on merit, less autonomy of the bureaucracy with high political 
control. 
2.3 Political-bureaucratic relations in Africa 
The discussion on the political-bureaucratic relations in the African continent in the context 
that African states are either developmental, underdeveloped, or predatory states. Also, the 
discussion extends to the key facts that affect the political-bureaucratic relations is the colonial 
legacy in Africa and the political interference in the recruitment, functioning, and promotion 
of the bureaucracy (Dasandi 2014:3). On the side of political interference, (Igbokwe-Ibeto 
2019) concludes that across the continent, there is a blurring differentiation between the 
bureaucracy and politicians; since recruitment, functioning, and promotion are centered on 
political loyalty and clientelism.  
For Miller (1975), the practice of politicizing the bureaucracy in Africa is based on the fact that 
several African states, when they gained their independence, wanted to create one-party states 
while others wanted one-party domination. Private international interest interests on the natural 
resources in African states also impact political-bureaucratic relations; thus, corrupt politicians 
need corrupt public officials administrator over the looting of resources (Mackenzie 2010:888). 
The scholar further adds looting of resources, clientelism, and corruption has led to some of 
the African states being classified as predatory states with military rule and military 
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2.3.1. Nigeria  
Among African countries, Nigeria is considered a political, military, and economic powerhouse 
in the continent. This is why a brief analysis of the country's political-bureaucratic relations 
would establish a dominant position on the nature of political-bureaucratic relations in the 
continent. Salami (2016) claims that the colonial legacy of Nigeria is one of the key factors 
that should be noted when studying the political-bureaucratic relations: for the colonial masters 
developed a bureaucracy that enabled them to successfully loot and extract both the financial 
and material resources without any accountability and the absence transparency. He further 
adds that this has created a culture of an uncooperative, corrupt, and incompetent bureaucracy 
that is recruited based on the corrupt interest of the private or politicians; on the other hand, 
this also created a culture of corrupt, greedy, wasteful, and parochial politicians (Salami 
2016:180). 
Agboola (2016), in support of the above, argues that after 30 years of being a predatory state, 
the democratically elected General Obasanjo continued with the entrenchment of both political 
and bureaucratic corruption. Due to political violence, the administration organized along 
ethnic and religious lines; the bureaucracy's recruitment was also based on ethnic and religious 
lines. Ojo (2016) concludes that most political-bureaucratic relations are based on a blurry 
distinction between politicians and bureaucrats: with the appointments centered on tribalism, 
nepotism, clientelism for extortion, and embezzlement of resources.   
 
2.4. Political-bureaucratic relations in South Africa  
Like Nigeria, South Africa also has a history of colonialism that ended in 1910 with South 
Africa under the Union of South Africa's governance system. Ginwala (1990) argues that from 
the analyses of the ANC, South Africa in 1910 become colonialization of a special type; for 
only the white society enjoy political power, racial privileges, the lion's share of the economy 
and land; white the back society was subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty, super-
exploitation, a complete denial of basic human rights, and political domination. Leacock (1910) 
further adds that this formation of the Union and created the selection of the bureaucracy was 
still based on gender, race, the political, and the economic interests of the majority (British or 
Boer descendants) in that particular region. With the introduction of apartheid in 1948, South 
Africa had two different bureaucracies: the white administration and the native administration. 
Evans (1997) points out the selection and appointment to the public service during this era were 
based on having an administration that would serve and advance the apartheid ideologies. 
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Cameron (2010) views such a form of politicization by the administration as a mechanism by 
the apartheid to exercise bureaucratic control and have a politically responsive bureaucracy.  
Such tight control of the bureaucracy also impacted the merit appointments, for the 
appointments were subject to race and ideological simulation with the regime. Posel (1999) 
characterized the apartheid bureaucracy as Afrikaner, ill-educated, intolerant, boorish, and yet 
very powerful. He concludes that the politicization of the bureaucracy was the 
'Afrikanerization' of the bureaucracy by the National Party; for even white liberal senior 
officials were replaced with loyal Afrikaner nationalist (Posel 1999:104) 
With the collapse of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC), due to the Afrikaner 
administration's mistrust, set on the objective to have a new constitution and public service that 
was no longer entrenched in the ideals of apartheid or that could threaten the very existence of 
democracy. Therefore, the ANC prioritized having a bureaucracy that was politically reliable 
and stable (Hyslop 2005:784); while the ANC was set on removing the Afrikaner officials, the 
'sunset-clause' protected these officials until 1999(Cameron 2010:683). 
 From there, Booysen (2017) argues the ANC deployed its members into various key positions 
in the public service to play the inter-mediatory role between the organization's political 
mission and the shaking of things in the public service. Cameron (2010) concludes that the 
politicization of the bureaucracy by the ANC is spelled out in its Cadre Policy and Deployment 
Strategy. Therefore, this further entrenched the political patronage culture and the blurring 
distinction between politicians and bureaucrats since senior public officials' appointments, 
retention, and functioning are based on political party suitability. 
 
2.5 THEORIES ON POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS  
 
Presumably, with the key terms conceptualized in the first chapter and through the theorization 
of the political-bureaucratic relations: the study can better understand and discuss the 
politicization and political control on the appointments and administrative function of 
municipal managers. Since the study is within the field of political sciences, it essential to 
understand that a key element of politics is about 'who gets what, when, and how; as such 
political scientists are concerned with examining the conflictual and consensual administration 
of public affairs by political actors. At the same time, public administration and governance 
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The study is concerned with politics and governance, especially concerning political parties' 
involvement and bureaucrats' behavior towards politicians and political parties. As Rahman 
(2015) correctly suggested that "probably the most elemental and theoretical debatable issue 
for millennia to political scientists and public administrations is that – what will be the apt 
relationships between the politicians and the bureaucrats (Rahmans 2015:41)." The study now 
looks at the theories that discuss political-bureaucratic relations. The theories around political-
bureaucratic relations are divided into two different schools of thought: the dichotomous lead 
by Weber; and Waldo's interface.  
 
2.5.1 Separate or dichotomous political-bureaucratic relations   
 
The founding fathers of the separate or dichotomous relationship are Wilson, Weber, and 
Goodnow: who advocate that administrators (bureaucrats) needed to be shielded from the 
interference of politics. Wilson, cited by Tahmasebi and Musavi, wrote: "The field of 
administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics: that the 
administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not 
political questions. Although politics sets the administration tasks, it should not be suffered to 
manipulate its offices (Tahmasebi and Musavi 2001:131)."  
 
Tahmasebi and Musavi(2001) thus suggest that the administration needs to be shielded from 
political interference. The primary concern for these scholars was the corrupting and 
politicizing involvement of party organizations in the administrative affairs, argues Tahmasebi 
and Musavi (2001:132). Sharing a similar line of thought, Goodnow (1900) argued that the 
function of politics in government is to express the popular will, with the administrators' role 
to execute the popular will through the state machinery. He concluded that certain aspects of 
the administration need to be shielded from politics (Goodnow 1900:9-10).  
 
This argument's rationale is that the political control over the administrative function produced 
an inefficient administration, for the concern is compliance with the political party's wishes 
rather than the execution policy (Goodnow 1900:83). Weber also draws a sharp distinction and 
separation between politicians and administrators: firstly, those civil servants should not 
participate in politics instead administer the implementation of policies impartially and remain 
politically neutral (Weber 1946: 27). Since bureaucrats are appointed on a specific set of 
competencies, where specialized professionals work on written rules, politics threatened 
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administrators' impersonality and impartiality. Scott Furlong suggests that scholars such as 
Wilson and Goodnow focused on the bureaucracy's autonomy in the policy implementation 
processes (Furlong 1998:39-40).  
 
However, critics of the dichotomous politics and bureaucratic relations model by Weber and 
Wilson assumed the bureaucrats had a blind and neutral allegiance to politicians. Robert 
Mertons (1940), offering his critic, developed a 'dysfunctional bureaucracy' his argument based 
on the bureaucracy becoming obsessed with procedural compliance. This was a bureaucracy 
that Weber ignored; a bureaucracy loses focus of its purpose within government: implementing 
policies and service; thus, the bureaucracy becomes a rigid bureaucracy (Mertons 1940:95).  
 
Chipkin and Lipeitz (2012) are supported also argued that the increasing criticism came when 
the bureaucracy failed to live up to its characterization from Weber and Wilson; instead, it 
became "too rigid, routinized and process-bound administrations, and it was unable to meet the 
increasingly diverse needs of fast-changing societies…. Weakness both in terms of the 
efficiency-the traditional bureau was wasteful, indeed easily prone to rent-seeking and it lacks 
political accountability (Chipkin and Lipeitz 2012:3)." Bosworth in his article 'A manager is a 
Politician 'argues that "by placing the manager directly in public view, accentuates public 
interest in how this kind of bureaucrat operates as a political leader (Bosworth 1985:216)." To 
conclude the criticism of the dichotomous relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, 
Rohr (1989:35-36) offers a deductive argument: 
 
 "1) Politics can be defined variously as "the authoritative allocation of values" as the 
determination of "who gets what, when, and how".  
2) Public administration is involved in all of these activities; 
3) Therefore, public administration is involved in politics and can rightly be 
called political itself." 
 
2.5.2 Inseparable political-bureaucratic relations 
Several contributions have been made toward the study political-bureaucratic interface by 
different scholars; Dwight Waldo still stands as the most prominent. Waldo (1987), taking a 
rather critiquing perspective of the Weberian bureaucracy, argued that it is empirically difficult 
to separate the administration from politics, and vice versa, for both, have the function to serve 
the state will (Waldo 1987:91). Werlin (2001) recognized that Waldo's critics are based on the 
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premise that Weber, Wilson, and Goodnow fail to recognize the role of political theories in 
public administration theories; thus, these scholars advocated for the separation of politics from 
the administration. 
Waldo further suggested that public administration scholars ignore the combined role of public 
administration in executing politicians' decisions with creativity, innovation, and 
professionalism with obedience (Werlin 2001:290). His perspective was public administration, 
and political science scholars need to understand the classical definition of politics, "the 
relationship of leadership to followership for the purpose of governance (Wolin, 1960:66)." 
Sotiropoulos (1994) also agrees by stating that such a relation viewed politicians and 
bureaucrats' interplay. As politicians being 'energizers,' they formulate state will vision and 
conception of policy, and while bureaucrats' equilibrators' based on expert knowledge 
equilibrate and accommodate conflicting interest in the execution of the state will.  
 
For Waldo (1978), this is the nature and interrelation of politics and administration relations in 
which the process of institutionalizing the values of allocation of resources and the pursuit of 
power needs a strong relationship between politicians and administrators. The involvement of 
politics in the administration should not be viewed as an interference and vice versa; instead, 
essential ingredient to the effective execution of state will (Waldo 1987: 91). Scholars such as 
Riggs (2001) argue that Waldo advocated for a reciprocal relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats; this was to avoid the bureaucracy's rigid role, the lack of accountability of 
bureaucracy, and the poor public service that exists. Both politicians and bureaucrats work 
together to pursue good governance and efficiency in service provision; both parties support 
each other mutually (Svara 2001:179).  
The values of allocation of resources cannot be imposed, nor can power be pursued without 
regulating frameworks (Werlin 2001:291). With these overlapping roles between politicians 
and administration, there is a possibility of conflictual or cooperative relations between these 
actors (Jacobsen 2001: 22); however, Moore (1995) suggest that based on the concept of 
political management as political-relations can be either the politicked-bureaucracy model, 
complementary or collaborative model.  
 
2.5.2.1Politicised-Bureaucracy Model 
Mafunisa (2003), analyzing the politics-administration interface's conceptualization, 
characterizes the politicized bureaucracy model as having no diction between the political party 
and government inclusive of both the political government and the administration. The political 
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party structures impose the appointment and the administrative decisions; more importantly, 
the appointments are on the allegiance to the ruling political party, and sometimes the skills, 
knowledge, experience, and expertise are ignored.  
Doullah (2016) acknowledges that the politicization of the bureaucracy differs from country to 
country based on the degree, the nature, and the extent of politicization on the political system. 
The scholar offers a different perspective to Mafunisa, suggesting that while the Politicized-
Bureaucracy Model is about the extent and degree of involvement or influence; however not 
all forms of influence or involvement are done consciously, and such actions are not limited to 
the ruling party, the opposition parties can also politicize the bureaucracy (Doullah 2016:30).  
 The Politicized-Bureaucracy Model's fundamental underpinnings are about the nature and 
extent that politicians control the bureaucracy through the appointment of political party 
members or allies into key strategic positions. The challenge with the bureaucracy's 
politicization is that it is linked to increased government corruption, bribes, and kickbacks 
aimed at the politicians' financial and political interests (Doullah 2016:31). 
Now the key challenge with the Politicized-Bureaucracy Model is that it is argued to impair 
the bureaucratic skills. For the appointments, functioning and dismissals are based on the 
political criteria rather than merit system, and thus, due to the political pressure from the 
politicians and the weak incentives for the development of the bureaucrats, this creates a high 
turnover of the bureaucrats (Boräng et al. 2014:7).  
 
This challenge contributed to the negative perception of the Politicized-Bureaucracy Model 
universally, for it reviewed as a substitution of merit-based criteria appointment and 
functioning of the public service with the use of the political criteria, and this is argued to 
negatively impact on the government's efficiency and public trust of government (Ban 2014:4). 
It is important to note that not all politicians or political parties in the politicized bureaucracy 
model seek to control the bureaucracy for corrupt reasons. 
 
2.5.2.2 Complementary Model   
It is clear from the literature that the above theories see that Political-Bureaucratic Interface is 
essential to the development and the strengthening of sound governance. However, a useful 
approach is still needed to help us better understand that in what way politicians and 
bureaucrats should relate. Svara (2001) suggests that it is crucial to consider the complementary 
model to understand how politicians and bureaucrats should relate.   
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The model deals with the reasoning that both politicians and bureaucrats have the common 
interest to pursue good and sound governance; this interest is based on having competent 
policies and having a responsive public service (Svara 2001:180). The interest of both play a 
significant role in understanding how the relationship should be.  
Waldo advocated that politicians always want to be in a relationship that can enhance their 
political action.  
This means that through the complementary model, each participant's benefits are clearly 
outlined and what each will gain. Svara (2001) notes under these models, both the politicians 
and bureaucrats understand their distinct but overlapping roles; therefore, the relationship 
between the two stakeholders is reciprocal and interdependent. The relationship is consensual 
and cooperative: politicians set the political and governance direction, probe areas on the poor 
performance of policies, and attempt to fine-tune the concern areas and maintain oversight over 
the bureaucrats and implementation. While the focus on the expert and professional capacity 
in policy-shaping; and provide technical content in the process implementation, service 
delivery, and good governance (Carboni 2010:90). With this model, a high level of political 
control cannot exist without undermining the bureaucracy's professional function (Carboni 
2010:90). The model is based on the following key characteristics:  
• interdependence along with distinct roles; 
• compliance along with independence;  
• respect for political control along with a commitment to shape and implement policy in 
ways that promote the public interest; 
• deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support for fair 
electoral competition; and appreciation of politics along with support for professional 
standards (Svara 2001:179). 
Demir (2009) concludes that the model "accepts overlapping roles and reciprocal influences 
between elected officials and public administrators in governance (2009:887)." This model 
reconciles the noted contradictions and weakness of the dichotomous model; by recognizing 
the interdependent and reciprocal influence of politicians and administrators (Svara 2001:179). 
A great deal of the models is based on mutual respect and support, where one complements 
and completes the other to create a whole (Carboni 2008:1). 
This model also considers environmental changes in the governing processes; they could 
expand politicians' political control and weaken the independence of administrators or increase 
the influence of administrators in both political and administrative decisions and weaken the 
23 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
oversight role of politicians (Svara 2001:180). In the complementary model, politicians are the 
ones that set direction to the nature of the relationship, which is simply the interface between 
political control by politicians and the professional interdependence and independence of 
administrators (Svara 2001:180). The type of government system and the influential power of 
political parties or politicians as individuals determine the level of administrators (Fukuyama 
2013: 359-362).   
 
2.5.2.3 Collaborative Model  
As had already been noted above, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats needs 
not to be distinct and separate; instead, they need to have overlapping interdependent roles. 
Thus, Dasandi and Esteve (2017) suggest that the collaborative model is good, especially for 
developing and developmental states- governments are actively promoting socio-economic 
development, and the dependence on democracy is development. The nature of the engagement 
and the factors the shape the engagements are fundamental for development; these scholar's 
proposed that a politicized or political pro bureaucracy is ideal. As such in the collaborative 
model, there is a very low separation between politicians and bureaucrats: with the influence 
of the bureaucrats in policy formulation, direction, and implementation; and politicians ensure 
that the bureaucrats are subordinate, share the same political background, and carrying out the 
roles to serve the political interest of politicians (Dasandi and Esteve 2017:232).  
Cameron (2003) suggests that bureaucrats needed to "politically suitable and acceptable," and 
that does not seem to be are dismissed in this model. However, in this model, the bureaucrats 
are still highly skilled and are selected on merit based on professional expertise and knowledge; 
they need to be also politically suitable and acceptable. Dasandi and Esteve conclude this are 
key characteristics of the collaborative model: 
• "Core group or "cadre" of developmental elites consisting of senior politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
• The unusually high degree of bureaucratic influence in proposing and design of policies.  
• An esprit de corps among the political and bureaucratic elites based on development 
objectives. 
 • Shared class and education backgrounds of political and bureaucratic elites.  
• Coherent and meritocratic bureaucracies.  
• Movement between bureaucratic and political positions.  








2.6 POLITICAL PARTIES ON THE POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS  
 
The majority of research on the politicization of the bureaucracy and political-bureaucratic 
relations argues that the interface or dichotomous relationship is simply between political 
office-bearers in government and the bureaucrats. The relationship is dependent on the nature 
of institutional arrangements of the state. Allern et al. (2011) view institutional arrangements 
were "the bureaucracy and meritocratic systems, the less are party organizations, cabinets and 
individual politicians able to reach into the state and make politically slanted appointments." 
The perspective shared by these scholars is that political parties can influence both the 
appointment and functioning of bureaucrats; their focus, however, is on patronage and non-
patronage appointments (Allern et al., 2011:2).  
The key question is, in what ways and means do political parties utilize to influence the 
appointment and functioning of bureaucrats? Is the influence aimed at attaining political 
control over the bureaucracy or create a complementary model of governance? The 
complementary model supporters advocate that bureaucrats and politicians share the same 
political ideals; what differs is the role and responsibility.  
The role of politicians is to come with their political manifesto and oversee the operation of the 
bureaucracy in implementation; on the other hand, the role of bureaucrats is to provide the 
necessary technical and expert support in the process of policy development and 
implementation, provide professional services in line with the principle of governance 
independent from political pressure. Contrary to the above model is the political control model, 
this model suggests that through the political office-bearers appoint senior management and 
general staff to control bureaucrats and the civil service (Mafunisa 2003:88).  
 
The sharp distinction between these models: is that in the complementary model's appointment, 
and the function of bureaucrats is based on the meritocratic system first; in the political control 
model, the appointments are made allegiance to the ruling party, and in most cases, the 
appointments are on based on the merit system. Schreurs et al. (2012) argue that to understand 
better political-bureaucrats relations, both political science, and public administration scholars 
need to consider the third-party influence, as they have significantly shaped and changed the 
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This study looks at political parties as the third party that either influences or directly control 
political-bureaucrat relations to create a complementary political-bureaucratic administration. 
The description of political parties supports this approach by the Electoral Institute of Southern 
Africa as: "organized groups that are formed with the sole purpose of articulating and 
aggregating the interest of the group, contesting control over state power and government, and 
directing a country's development process in with their ideological orientations and their 
framework" (Matlosa and Shale 2008:20).  
 
Political parties can be defined as interest groups focused on exercising government power 
through the winning of the political office; thus acting as the voters' representatives in their 
control of governance, how they rule, and they allocate and distribute resources, according to 
Heywood (2003). This means that political parties are accountable to the voters; thus, any 
politician deployed by the political party in public office is accountable both to the political 
party and the citizens; with the interest of retaining governing power of the state machine, 
during the election, they once again go back to the voters needing their vote. 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
From the above theoretical discussion, it can be said that political parties' role in the political-
bureaucratic relations in government needs to be examined more deeply by political scientists 
and public administration scholars. The different Inseparable Theory models shape the 
theoretical underpinning on politicization, political control, and the nature of the political-
bureaucratic relations. However, one notable thing is that the shift from a dichotomous 
relationship to an interface relationship still has issues of bureaucratic autonomy, performance, 
sound governance, and political control of bureaucrats. The challenge still stands on creating 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapters have alluded that politicization and political control over the 
bureaucracy by political parties or political agents have been viewed with negativity and 
perceived to be at the centre of government maladministration, corruption, and service delivery 
failure. Thus, in an attempt to understand the nature of politicization, political control, and 
political-bureaucratic relations issues in the South African local government sphere; this 
chapter discusses the processes, means, or mechanisms that political parties or the political 
government use to politicize the appointment and function of a municipal manager in a 
municipality. The chapter examines politicization practices in the local government sphere, 
specifically on municipal managers from post-2001 and till currently. The chapter uses reported 
cases of politicization and existing literature on the topic to discuss such a phenomenon. The 
chapter is made of five sections and is guided by the following research questions: 
• What are the interest and reasons for the political parties' politicization of municipal 
manager's positions or the political government?  
• To what extent is the politicization perceived to affect the quality, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of service delivery? 
The first section covers the legislative guidelines for the employment and function of municipal 
managers concerning the powers and function of the political government and the external 
political party structure. The second section discusses the causes and reasons for political or 
patronage appointments of municipal managers by political parties or political agents. The third 
section discusses the challenges on the local government sphere that are argued or perceived 
to be linked with the challenge of politicization and political control and how these challenges 
impact the local sphere's performance and function. The fourth section covers the changing 
nature of politics in the local government sphere and how this impacts the political relations 
within the sphere, focusing on coalition governments, especially in the metro municipalities. 
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3.2 THE LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES ON THE POWERS AND FUNCTION OF 
MUNICIPAL COUNCILS AND POLITICAL EXECUTIVE  
 
While the literature on the political-bureaucratic relations is somehow limited in terms of the 
legislative guidelines on the municipal council's powers and functions, executive mayors, and 
municipal managers in South Africa. Cameron (2010) suggests that the country's laws clearly 
define the roles and functions: starting from the Constitution, Municipal Systems Act, the 
Municipal Structures Act, and Regulations for the Appointment of Municipal Managers. The 
South African local government sphere has 257 municipalities, with each having a municipal 
manager: 8 metro municipal managers, 44 district municipal managers, and 205 local 
municipal managers ( Pretorious 2017:38).  
Due to politicization in the recruitment and function of municipal managers, it is reported that 
in 2018 only 94 municipalities had adhered to the legislative guidelines in terms of employing 
municipal managers with the relevant required qualifications, skills, and experience(Davis 
2018). While more than 40 municipalities have acting-municipal managers: there could be 
reasons why municipalities are not adhering to the legislative guidelines and prescripts; 
however, this study considers the contravention of the legislative prescripts as politically 
motivated. Adding to the crisis is the high staff turnover and delays in making appointments, 
especially when municipal councils do not adhere to the guidelines and prescripts (Davids 
2018).  
In terms of the provisions of the Constitutions, sections (160) "stipulates the powers and 
functions of municipal councils are to make decisions concerning the exercise of all the powers 
and the performance of all the functions of the municipality; must elect its chairperson; may 
elect an executive committee and other committees, subject to national legislation; and may 
employ personnel that is necessary for the effective performance of its functions." Pasquini and 
Shearing (2014) argue that politics is central to municipal councils' functioning; therefore, most 
municipal councils' decisions are politically motivated. This includes the ability to employ 
persons, and the position of the municipal manager is by no means excluded; instead, it is one 
of the most- highly prioritized posts (Pasquini and Shearing 2014: 290).  
The reasons for the prioritization of the municipal manager position, according to Mashimate 
(2014), is that the municipal manager is the head of the administration and the driver of the 
vehicle by which the municipal council provides services to the citizens, and a key person in 
meeting needs political interest and expectations of the ruling party in a municipality. Cameron 
(2010) concludes that the municipal managers' politicization firstly creates unclear roles 
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between municipal managers and members of the municipal executives; secondly, due to the 
undue political influence and interference by political parties, there is an inappropriate 
relationship between political party structures and municipalities. Hence in most cases where 
there is an inappropriate relationship or involvement, there is also a contradiction of mandates, 
patronage, and corruption (Mehlape 2018:331). 
Also, a key challenge in the legislative provisions, they do not speak about a municipal 
council's political interest. The Municipal Structures Act dictates that it is the prerogative and 
responsibility of the municipal council to appoint a municipal manager as the head of 
administration and the accounting officer of a municipality. Such a municipal council's 
responsibility is also outlined in the Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and 
Conditions of Employment for Senior Managers document: which indicates that the municipal 
council must appoint a selection panel for the appointment. It is important to note that the 
selection panel, similar to the municipal council, is a political structure with added 
administrative capacities. Since the chairperson in most instances is the municipal mayor, with 
at least one municipal councilor, and one person who is not councilor or member staff of the 
municipality that has the expertise or experience in the post. 
 
The selection panel's responsibility consists of compiling the shortlist of the candidates: it 
conducts the interviews and makes commendations to the Municipal Executive Committee. 
The executive committee that the mayor chairs provides the municipal council with the 
recommended candidate: section (18) of the Regulations further stipulates that the municipal 
must consider the executive committee's recommendations and decide on the appointment. 
Such function of the executive committee or executive mayor is also entailed in section (30) 
(5)(c) of the Municipal Structures Act: the committee should furnish a report to the council on 
the recommendation on the appointment and the condition of employment of the municipal 
manager. 
Surty (2010) points out that based on the employer-employee relationship, the municipal 
manager's employment is hugely dependant on the opinion of the executive council or the 
mayor. Surty's (2010) perspective is based on the Politicized-Bureaucracy Theory; thus, the 
appointed municipal manager aims to complement the municipal council's political aspirations. 
Therefore, the municipal manager acts on behalf of the municipal council or mayor to execute 
the political mandate; the municipal council monitors and oversees the municipal manager's 
actions. Should the municipal manager act in a manner against the municipal council's political 
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interest: especially its chairperson (mostly the mayor), the municipal manager, according to the 
theory dismissed, and the municipal council looks for another politically suitable manager.  
Van der Waldt (2015) argues that one of the Constitution's shortfalls is that it does not explicitly 
indicate the separation of powers within municipalities, and as such municipal councils and the 
municipal executive committees somehow politically interfere in the administrative affairs of 
the municipal managers. While the scholar does not link such political interference with the 
politicized-bureaucracy theory; however, he observed that municipal councils or the municipal 
executive committees impose several directives on municipal managers (Van der Waldt 
2015:26). 
Thus, for the proper implementation of such directives, the Politicized-Bureaucracy Model 
approach is used during municipal managers' appointments. The appointments are primarily 
influenced by the political suitable of the municipal managers (Cameron 2003:51). Therefore, 
municipal managers' appointment's political suitability: the municipal council intends to create 
a complementary municipal administration that will serve both the municipal council's 
administrative and political interests. 
Demir and Nyahan (2008) suggest that generally, the legislative prescripts are not vocal on 
bureaucrats' appointment based on political suitability. These scholars further note that 
politicization allows the principals to have political control of the bureaucrats and the staff 
accounting to them (Demir and Nyahan 2008:84). Since the political government structures are 
in themselves agents of the external political party that is the principal, the political interest of 
the principal dictates for the appointment of the municipal managers; however, it is not always 
that the political government is acting in the interest or as per the directives on the external 
political party. 
 
3.3 REASONS AND CAUSE FOR THE POLITICIZATION OF MUNICIPAL 
MANAGERS  
 
According to Kopecký et al. (2013), most of the scholarly attention within the political sciences 
has been on increasing political patronage and political appointments within the bureaucracy 
as a global phenomenon. These scholars conclude that the reasons for the politicization of the 
bureaucracy globally are based on two: the need to have power and control of state institutions 
and the desire to reward local supporters of the party, activist, friends, or family members of 
politicians (Kopecký et al. 2013: 423).  
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In explaining political parties' behavior, Holcombe and Gwartney (1989) share a similar 
perspective by pointing out that the fundamental interest of the political party has power and 
control. Part of the behavior, according to Hope (1985), is the involvement, influence, or 
interference to any degree, directly or indirectly, overt or implicit in the appointment, 
promotion, or function of the bureaucracy in the political interest of the political party or 
individuals within the political party.  
Such influence or involvement can be measured by analyzing the level of influence that the 
political party or individuals have in the decision-making processes of the bureaucracy and also 
the nature of the political-bureaucratic relations and the level of interaction; also the level of 
the bureaucracy in the political activities of the party and the politics of the political 
government; and the level of political involvement and interference in the functioning of the 
bureaucracy (Hope 1985:2). The scholars conclude that at the center of politicization is the 
quest for power- to offer employment, security, access to resources, and though the 
appointments increase the party's political power or individuals on the bureaucracy. 
 
3.3.1 Access to Political and Administrative Power over a Municipality  
 
Booysen (2011) suggests that one of the reasons for the politicization of the municipal manager 
posts and other senior government positions by the African National Congress is about having 
a bureaucracy that will address the historical legacies of apartheid and lead the transformation 
agenda of the political party. Ndedi and Kok(2017), in support, adds that the deployment of 
cadres into these positions by the ANC is about having municipal managers that understand 
and appreciate the ideological orientation, policies, and political programmes of the ANC. 
Therefore, it is crucial to have a municipal manager that the political conviction to serve the 
intellect depth and skills to lead the ANC's transformation agenda through government, 
representing a complementary relationship between the political and administrative power in 
municipalities(Ndedi and Kok 2017:6). Such complementary relationship between the political 
and administrative leaders enables the political party to implement party policy and take 
political decisions on resource allocation.  
Twala (2014) further adds that the African National Congress exercises its cadre deployment 
policy in both the political and administrative positions in government, including municipal 
managers and other senior managers' positions. He concludes that the rationale of the 
implementation of cadre deployment is to have power and control to accelerate the 
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transformation and development of the South Africa society; through the politicized municipal 
manager post, the party aimed to limit any form of sabotage or resistance and neutralize any 
political or administrate threat (Twala 2014:159).  
The argument for such politicization by the African National Congress is that it ensures 
synergy, synchronization, and seamless interpretation and implementation of party policy into 
government programs. Thus, the best approach is for this to be conducted successfully by one 
of its own: who can best interpret and implement the party's aspirations. Cameron (2003) argues 
that the Democratic Alliance from 2001 has been exercising the appointment of municipal 
managers that are politically suitable and acceptable to the party in the municipalities it leads: 
the justification is that municipal manager posts are politically sensitive and are not simply 
bureaucratic. Uwizeyimana and Cloete (2003) also add that the Democratic Alliance politicized 
senior government officials' appointment in the Western Cape Provincial government and in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Inkatha Freedom Party, when it leads a municipality applies the same 
strategy. 
Furthermore, such political and administrative hegemony over municipalities by political 
parties also extends to the allocation or award of municipal tenders through the preferential 
procurement system. Munzhedzi (2016) argues that political parties can influence the tender 
bid and tender adjudication committees through the politicization of the municipal manager 
post and the Chief Financial Officer Position. Kopecký et al. (2013) suggest that such 
clientelistic use of power aims to control the granting of contracts to the party or politician's 
financial supporters, using close associates from personal enrichment or funding for the 
political party. Thus, political parties need municipal managers that are politically loyal and 
trustworthy. 
3.3.2 Party politics, political competition and gatekeeping  
Beresford (2015) refers to South African politics as bewildered with corruption, infighting, 
gatekeeping, neo-patrimonialism, rent-seeking, cronyism, and clientelism; this also includes 
the local government sphere. According to De Camara (2016), the political environment 
internally in the political parties is fragile with high levels of factionalism and infighting; and 
the use of the close proportional representation system is at the center of the factional 
contestations. Intra-party politics have a considerable influence and impact on the political and 
administrative government, even at the local government level. Olver (2018) describes rent-
seeking as the use of the political arena for individuals' personal benefit; patronage as political 




32 | P a g e  
 
Beresford (2015) suggests that the spread of patronage-based relationships in the ANC has 
influenced the practice in other political parties; and links such spread to the growth of 
gatekeeper politics. A similar pattern of political behavior is also seen in the political party 
such as the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters; however, such practices are at a small scale compared to the ANC. The reasons are 
based on political dominance and the size of the ANC.  
The intra-party politics and the dominance of voting based on factions with political parties 
also extends to regional and branch politics. Mac Giollabhui (2018) describes the nature of 
intra-party politics, which consists of bribing delegates and external support from various 
business people to fund the political campaigns of the factions they support. The winning 
faction within the political party has a considerable influence or control of the proportional 
representation list for the municipal councils and based on the election outcomes, the members 
on the list gain access to state power.  
In most cases, those given political power in the regions is awarded for their political support 
in the provincial and national contestations. Furthermore, the winning factions are considered 
gatekeepers since it is argued that the power to grant and deny access to resources and 
opportunities; includes bureaucrats' appointment. The appointment of bureaucrats also serves 
as part of ensuring that the gatekeepers' financial supporters are also rewarded through 
contracts and tenders.  
As such, the political clientelist relations involve the distribution of resources for the 
gatekeepers' private gain and their supporters (Masenya 2017: 154). Thus, municipal managers' 
political appointment is either a reward for the political support of the political party or the 
faction within the political party for the distribution of resources to the patrons, or a person that 
will protect and promote the political survival of the winning faction or gatekeepers. Olver 
(2018), using the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro as a case study, suggests that the about 2 billion 
of the annual metro is contracted out to service providers; thus, for the appointment of several 
contractors by the metro, the city manager was routinely summoned to the ANC regional 
offices for a briefing and instruction. Thus, the contracts were subject to the approval of the 
ANC regional structure.  
Olver concludes that in many councils, the appointment of staff and contractors is subject to 
intense political contestations and political considerations on the principles of loyalty and 
support (Olver 2018:281). The municipal managers' appointments are part of a political 
mandate or directive from the regional structures, and such politicization of the local 
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government management also extends to deputy directors and junior staff within the 
municipality. 
3.4 CHALLENGES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPHERE  
 
While anti-politicization scholars argue that politicization and political control of the 
bureaucracy by political agents corrupts, undermines, destroys, and erodes administrative 
efficiency government institutions. On the other hand, pro-politicization supporters generally 
view politicization and political control as a key tool that increases accountability of the 
bureaucrats to the politicians; ensures good relations and smooth implementation of the policy 
and programs. However, both sides agree that while the relationship between politicians and 
the municipal managers is multi-faceted and complex, political parties and the political 
government find various strategies to create a relationship without tension and conflict in a 
municipality.  
Reddy (2016) also argues that political infighting, faction clashes, service delivery protests, 
and administrative failures in the South African local government are an order of the day. The 
primary factor is political nature, and the political and administrative government clashes 
cripple this sphere of government. He further adds that the majority party, a municipality, 
determines political and administrative power relations (Reddy 2016: 338).  
Cameron (2003) thus suggests that such power is also subject to the external majority political 
party's political interest in a municipality. As such, municipal managers' appointments and 
functioning have become increasingly politicized by political parties over the last two decades. 
According to Nzo (2016), such an increase has also coincided with an increase in weak political 
leadership and political violence, corruption, patronage, rent-seeking, neo-patrimonialism, 
municipal maladministration, and a decline in service delivery and municipal efficiency.  
While the scholar mentions several factors that may be possibly linked with the politicization 
of the appointment and function of municipal managers (Nzo 2016:98). Atkinson (2003) 
suggests that the country's political transition in 1994 has a massive factor in the local 
government administration's politicization. Since many experienced municipal managers 
represented the old regime and many left for the private sector and the application of the 
affirmative action policies.  
This leads to too many appointments based on political patronage by the African National 
Congress (Atkinson 2003:5). Thus much on the power to make appointments, the 
appointment's motives, and the appointees' roles in subject to the ruling party according to the 
principle-agent theory. Such a perspective is supported by Panizza et al. (2018), who state that 
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the appointees serve at the discretion and subjects of the patron (politician or political party); 
such appoints are based on trust and loyalty between the patron and the appointee. 
3.4.1 Governance and Administration challenges  
 
According to Cameron (2010), the partisan control of the bureaucracy by political parties or 
politicians and the bureaucracy's function subject to the political control and interest of the 
political agents more than the administrative norms and the legislative guidelines has received 
much criticism even by the ANC. The replacement of merit appointments with political 
suitability and loyal by the political agents, according to Mafunisa (2001) for the creation of a 
politicized bureaucracy model, remains the source of the problems of the local government 
sphere. 
 
Koma and Kuye (2014) view the local government as being plagued with "the municipal 
mismanagement; lack of financial management and abuse of budget with poor audit outcomes; 
political infighting; corruption and nepotism; lack of infrastructure planning, investment, and 
maintenance; insufficient capacity due to a lack of scarce skills, high vacancy rates, poor 
performance management, and inadequate training and with also the challenges of provincial 
and national government escalating to local governance structures" (Koma and Kuye, 2014: 
103). The challenge is the influence of regional or provincial political party structures in the 
appointment of personnel with very little to the required skills and expertise (Republic of South 
Africa 2014: 35). 
 
Koma and Kuye (2014) further suggest that municipal managers view themselves as more 
accountable to the political party than the public through such politicization. This perspective 
is also held by Kok and Ndedi (2017), arguing most municipal managers believe that they are 
only accountable to the party and advance the parties' interests ahead of those of the public. 
Makanyeza et al. (2013) argue that such politicization is the cause for poor service delivery, a 
breeder of corruption and private gain; it also increases the lack of accountability and 
transparency in municipalities, increases the political influence and interference in the 
awarding of government contracts, and increases service delivery protest. Various media 
reports have reported on the rampant corruption and maladministration within the sphere linked 
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Natal Witness reported serious corruption and maladministration allegations by both the senior 
administrative and political officials in the UMzimkhulu municipality: the rampant corruption 
and abuse of resources by municipal officials, including municipal managers, are also alleged 
to be the reason for the political killing of prominent African National Congress councilor by 
Sindiswa Magaqa (Singh 2018). Furthermore, it is suggested that in most of the politicized 
municipalities, there is a lack-off separation between politicians and administrators; thus, the 
municipalities most have poor governance systems, most fail their municipal audits, and some 
get placed administrations ( Madumo 2016:85).To further add to the crisis, politicization is also 
linked to fraud, corruption, and self-enrichment; year in-and-year-out municipal officials are 
arrested on fraud and corruption accounts. 
 
In support of the above, the Auditor General's report on local government in 2012 also indicated 
that 115 of the 283 municipalities received unqualified, in the 2015-2016 AG reports, no 
municipality in Limpopo achieved a clean audit. Mdlongwa notes that lack of clean audits 
linked to the following challenges that hamper service delivery. The Auditor-General 
concludes that "the appointment of human resources without the technical skills and capacity 
slows rollouts of services; while corruption, maladministration, and financial mismanagement 
cripple the effectiveness of municipalities ( AGSA 2016:12). Furthermore, another concern by 
the Auditor-General is the inadequate management of consultants, in which more than 800 
million was spent on consultants (AGSA 2016:12). The appointment of consultants is also 
considered part of awarding supporters of the political parties or leading political figures.  
 
To further add to the existing challenges, some of the consultant firms are either owned by 
prominent political figures or close relatives; or are sponsors of the political parties. The 
Auditor-General does conclude that most municipalities have weak planning and appointment 
processes, performance management and monitoring, and transferring of skills in 
municipalities (AGSA 2016:18). As such, the South Human Rights Commission reported that 
local government is still faced with the following challenges which negatively impact service 
delivery in municipalities and are a lack:  
"A) proper governance and budgeting, particularly in the implementation of and spending on 
projects 
b) Co-operative governance between departments jointly responsible for municipal services 
c) Capacity and skill (both in the sense of having adequate knowledge as well as a high vacancy 
rate in municipalities) 
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d) Transparency in hiring external contractors and in holding contractors accountable for the 
quality of services delivered 
e) Understanding or implementation of a human rights-based approach to service delivery in 
respect of transparency and public participation 
f) Monitoring and evaluation of projects implemented by local government and 
g) Monitoring and evaluation of the utilization of funds allocated to local government (SAHRC 
2015:7)" 
   
 3.4.2 Political-bureaucratic power relations 
 
As can be deduced from the above, many of the factors that pose serious challenges to the local 
government sphere are linked to governance and administration. Key to achieving good 
governments has the right administrative staff; having the freedom to work effectively and 
efficiently without political interference while executing their duties. Boshoff (2011) argues 
that the local government sphere is highly politically contested terrains and as such party-
political differences and relations are also a fundamental challenge to municipalities rendering 
quality and efficient services. The challenges include the removal of political office-bearers 
such as the Mayor, Speaker, and any of the Executive Committee members. 
 
 Such removals are mainly based on internal political differences or changes in political 
relations in a coalition- government. To further add to the challenges of political difference is 
the dismissal of municipal managers and S56 managers by newly established municipal council 
after removing existing: this is done to have managers loyal to the specific individuals or party 
that are ruling in the municipality. Loyalty is placed ahead of competency and performance 
excellence.  
For Kayane (2010), such selections first weaken governance mechanisms, such as 
accountability, administrative capacity, and excellence in service delivery; instead, they 
become tools to facilitate corrupt and fraudulent practices. Laubscher (2012) correctly 
observed that based on the selection of incompetent managers, most "municipal have poor 
financial control and lack of accountability, leading to extensive corruption and financial 
mismanagement with detrimental consequences for effective and efficient service delivery" 
(Laubscher 2012:63). He further suggests that a key of contributory factor to the weak financial 
control is that there is a "tendency to appoint politically-connected individuals as municipal 
managers and senior managers at the local government sphere (Laubscher 2012:63).  
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Too many skilled professionals were being denied job opportunities in municipalities because 
they were outside the party political networks that have captured civil service jobs for 
patronage. As long as unqualified managers with political connections are being rewarded with 
excessive salaries and performance bonuses, it is evident that the municipalities will not 
succeed in providing effective and efficient service delivery (Laubscher 2012: 65). 
3.5  IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SPHERE METROS 
 
Pasquini and Shearing (2014) further argue that increased political competition, party politics, 
and political instability needs systematic and comprehensive literature on how these affect 
municipalities' overall functioning. As part of adding to the literature, the study discusses the 
recent political changes in the metro municipalities and how such changes affect city managers' 
appointments and functions. The rationale for selecting metro municipalities is on the hype and 
use of the metros as a critical indicator in analyzing the political change in the local government 
sphere, and those metro municipalities are category-A municipalities. 
According to Isike and Onapajo (2017), the 2016 municipal elections dramatically changed 
South African politics' political landscape and the African National Congress's dominance grip 
on the Metro Cities. Simultaneously, there are several reasons for dramatic change, including 
the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters, rampant corruption, serious internal politics 
within the African National Congress, and the Democratic Alliance's fighting against president 
Zuma, the mastermind and godfather of corruption and state capture, etc. 
As previously alluded to, there are various reasons for the municipal manager's politicization, 
and such reasons are primarily based on the increasing political competition among political 
parties and internally within political parties and the political survival amongst politicians. The 
outcome of the 2016 elections left the African Nelson Congress with three metros (Mangaung, 
Buffalo city, EThekwini); the Democratic Alliance has 1(Cape Town metro); the Nelson 
Mandela Bay, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, and Tshwane metro governed under the coalition or 
political cooperation government of the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters and other small parties.  
In the 2011 elections, the African National Congress enjoyed dominance in all metros except 
the Cape Town metro; the decline of dominance in the recent election led to the ANC's 
governing the Ekurhuleni Metro under a coalition/political cooperation. The coalition or 
political cooperation in the metros is a new phenomenon in the South African political 
38 
 
38 | P a g e  
 
landscape, and as such, very little literature exists, especially in reference to the appointments, 
dismissals, and functioning of municipal managers. 
 
3.5.1 Ekurhuleni Metro 
 
The ANC's hegemony has steadily declined in the Ekurhuleni metro from 66 percent in the 
2011 elections to 48% in the 2016 elections; this led to the ANC seeking another political party 
to govern. Thus to govern the metro, the African National Congress reached a coalition or 
political cooperation agreement with the African Independent Congress (AIC), which was 
based on the political interest in the re-incorporating of Matatiele into Kwa-Zulu Natal 
(Magubane 2018). Such an agreement directly impacted the Matatiele municipality and its 
people who want to return to the Kwa-Zulu Natal province.  
The ANC national leadership needed to meet the demands of the people of Matatiele, to have 
the power and control over the metro.  
It is important to note that the ANC's internal infighting and factions from national to regional 
level are key reasons why the ANC votes declined in the metro ( Justesen and Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2018). These scholars further add that service delivery maladministration, 
patronage politics, corruption, and heightened frustrations by voters all contributed to the 
ANC's decline ( Justesen and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2018:1135). In the ANC's internal politics, 
pro-President Jacob Zuma's faction of Masina won the regional congress. With the president 
enjoying low favourability ratings and seen as the mastermind of state capture, several ANC 
members and supporters we not happy with the outcome and also against the nomination of 
Masina as a mayoral candidate for he was viewed as a Zuma-Gupta puppet. 
As part of being a loyal supporter of the Masina faction, Dr. Imogen Mashazi was appointed 
as city manager, and what made the appointment credible is that Mashazi is a former Chief 
Finance Officer and acting-Manager of the metro (Buthelezi 2017). Even though she possessed 
the needed skills and qualifications, her appointment is seen as politically motivated by the 
mayor and the ANC regional political structure. It also alleged, "that the city manager is part 
of the looting of the municipal resources with the African National Congress regional and 
branch leaders" (Reporter 2018). Hence, the city managers' appointment should also be viewed 
as part of political survival and award for the support that Mashazi provided the Mashazi 
faction.  
The city manager has been linked with seeking bribery from one of the contractors together 
with one of the ANC branch chairpersons (Reporter 2018). Since the metro is governed through 
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a political agreement and any coalition changes are likely to bring about administrative 
changes. Thus, if a new political leadership of the municipality was to emerge, which is likely 
to be DA and EFF led, it is likely to pursue the allegations against the city to ensure the 
possibility of an appointment of a city that will be more politically suitable. However, such a 
process is likely too much resistance from ANC in terms of any political administration 
changes: for already one motion of no confidence on the mayor has failed. 
3.5.2 Nelson Mandela Bay Metro  
The ANC's decline in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro was hugely influenced by the intra-party 
conflicts, contestations, and factional groups in the region. Ndletyana and Nomarwayi (2016) 
view the 'Polokwane factor' as the epitome of the intra-party conflicts and factions in the ANC: 
the Zuma faction no longer needed those supporting Thabo Mbeki to service in the 
administration either as public servants or political leaders. Such political infighting in the 
ANC resulted in the disruption and dysfunctionality of both the municipal administration and 
the municipal council in the 2011-2016 municipal term and the regional leadership's 
disbandment. The municipal manager's office in the administration became the most affected; 
thus, Ndletyana and Nomarwayi (2016) note that from 2009 the metro was operating under an 
acting municipal manager after Graham Richards vacated the post acrimonious conditions. 
Furthermore, concerning the changes in the metro's political leadership during the same period, 
Mayor Nondumiso Maphazi was replaced by Mr. Zanoxolo Wayile as mayor. The reasons for 
the removal were political and factionally motivated: part of a strategy to rid the Mbeki 
supporters from the party and state power, thus Wayile supported the Zuma faction ascended 
to the mayoral office Maphazi of the Mbeki faction removed (Ndletyana and Nomarwayi 
2016:577). Furthermore, the ANC's internal disagreements, especially between Nceba Faku 
(former mayor, member of the REC of the ANC, and provincial chairperson of COSATU) on 
the municipal manager's appointment, further added to the crisis. The REC preferred 
Sithembele Vatala, while Wayile favored Thabo Ndlovu and was determined to make the 
appointment; however, Vatala blocked the process with a court interdict. 
It is also acknowledged that as a political retaliation to the action of Vatala, Wayile was 
appointed as acting municipal manager and dismissed Mr. Elias Ntoba in 2011. Challenges in 
the metro continued, as several executives, managerial positions had interim heads subject to 
the REC's preference (Ndletyana and Nomarwayi 2016:582).  
All challenges lead to the decline of the ANC and poor performance of the municipal 
administrations: thus, the outcome of such political infighting led to the ANC losing the metro 
to the DA-EFF coalition government in the 2016 local government elections. According to 
40 
 
40 | P a g e  
 
Mokgosi et al. (2017), coalition or political agreements in the South African local government 
are likely to increase. However, what is interesting about the coalitions in South Africa, is that 
they are subject to national politics, and the Nelson Mandela Bay metro is a perfect example 
of this.  
Hence, in 2018 after the Economic Freedom Fighters leadership in the metro received a 
mandate from the national leadership remove DA's executive mayor Athol Trollop: due to 
difference in the expropriation of land without compensation issue, and that the mayor stood 
as a representative of white supremacy( Mahlati,2018). After the removal of Trollip as mayor 
and Mbulelo Manyati as a speaker, the African National Congress and the United Democratic 
Movement entered into a coalition: this resulted in UDM candidate Mongameli Bobani being 
the executive, major, and DA councilor Buyelwa Mafaya as municipal-speaker. 
The intensity of the nature of the politicization also occurred with Mayor Athol Trollip took 
office; soon afterward, the DA-EFF lead coalition dismissed acting city manager Vuyo 
Mlokoti, as he was considered to be a pro-ANC manager. The mayor, in 2016, appointed 
Johann Mettler, who was the acting city manager and former Chief Financial Officer of the 
municipality. It is important to note that while Mr. Mettler has the required qualifications, 
skills, and experience to be a municipal manager, he was also politically suitable after serving 
as a municipal manager in the DA-led Drakenstein municipality. In addition to the above, 
Johann Mettler was also a candidate that the African National Congress could not vote against 
after rescuing the ANC-led uMsunduzi municipality in 2010. 
After the removal of Trollip in 2018 and the changes in the coalition government, the metro 
was now lead by a UDM -ANC government. Due to the different political interests, the new 
mayor Mongameli Bobani dismissed Johann Mettler as municipal manager, and Pieter Nielson 
was appointed as acting manager (Lugunya 2018). Peter did not enjoy much time in the office; 
in May 2019, the executive mayor announced that city manager Peter Nielson was relieved 
from his acting duties. While Bobani cited medical reasons for the relief, Anna Reporter (2019) 
argues that the DA's criminal charges against Bobani and Nielson on corruption, especially on 
Integrated Public Transport System, are primarily the reasons. The Democratic Alliance also 
argued that Nielson did not possess the minimum qualifications and competencies and that his 
appointment was irregular (Reporter 2019). 
Soon after Nielson's removal, Nolwandle Gqiba was appointed as the acting city manager; 
however, after three months, she was replaced by Noxolo Nqwazi. Furthermore, due to the 
political pressure to remove Bobani as mayor, the executive mayor took a unilateral decision 
to remove Nqwazi as acting manager and replaced her with Nobuntu Mgogoshe as acting city 
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manager (Kimberley and Nkosi 2019). Mgogoshe is argued not have needed competencies and 
expertise to act as a city manager according to the DA (Tandwa 2019); she also appointed a 
municipal accountant Karl Kramer as CFO, without having the required senior management 
experience as per legislations (De Kock 2019).  
In terms of politics, the DA called for the metro to be placed under administration, the party 
also placed a motion of vote of no confidence in the executive mayor. The African National 
Congress supported the motion, Congress of the People (COPE), African Independent 
Congress (AIC), and the United Front, while the EFF abstained from voting (Kimberley 2019). 
After the ousting of Bobani as mayor, Mgogoshe was removed as acting city manager, and 
Noxolo Nqwazi was re-instated as the acting city manager (Kimberley and Nkosi 2019). 
Thsonon Buyeye is the interim mayor of the political and administratively embattled metro 
with several vacant executive directors and accounting managers posts (De Kock 2019).  
It is clear that the political infighting within the municipality is the leading cause of the 
administrative instability; therefore, the political coalitions increase the lack of distinction 
between politics and administration and also increase the need to have greater political control 
over the administration. Such changes in the administration and vacancies in senior manager 
posts are likely to have a massive impact on the metro's inability to render services effectively. 
3.5.3 Tshwane Metro  
In both the Tshwane and Johannesburg metro, the Economic Freedom Fighters were the king-
makers with 11 percent of the respective municipalities' votes. While the ANC has 41 percent 
in Tshwane and 44 percent in the Johannesburg Metro, and the DA 43 percent in the Tshwane 
and 38 percent in the Johannesburg metro.  
In both metros, the EFF entered into a coalition with the DA to ensure that the DA runs the 
metros. As already mentioned on the political developments that impacted the change of the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Mayor, Athol Trollip, the EFF had indicated that Tshwane mayor 
would be next.  
 The Mayor of Tshwane, Solly Msimanga faced motions of no confidence against him: it is just 
that the ANC and the EFF had not agreed on forming a coalition. With the increasing political 
fighting between the DA and the EFF and with the 2019 elections on the door, it was just a 
matter of time that the Tshwane political leadership would change. The EFF attempted to oust 
the Executive Mayor through a motion of no confidence; however, that failed; the EFF also 
decided to walk out on a motion of no confidence pushed by the ANC. The motion was based 
on the city manager Dr. Mosola implicating the mayor in a scandalous multibillion-rand 
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contract tender with Glad Africa (Andersen, 2018). In response, the mayor attempted to 
suspend the city manager on two accounts, which both failed.  
The ANC also laid criminal charges on both the mayor and the city manager: for the 
embezzlement of city funds and the Municipal Structure Act's contravention in the awarding 
of the Glad Africa tender (Reporter 2018). The ANC further accused the mayor of awarding 
the illegal tender: so that the contractors can fund this campaign against the internal DA 
contestation for the federal chairperson position (Kgosana, 2018). In contrast, the Public 
Protector Report and the Auditor-General did not implicate the mayor.  
It can be suggested that, indeed, the city manager's office has been politicized for the DA's 
internal political battles and for funding the DA in general. This became clearer when 
Msimanga soon stepped down as mayor and became the DA's premier candidate in the 2019 
national elections. The city manager soon followed the mayor; as the city under mayor 
Stevens's leadership, Mokgalapa reached a mutual agreement to part ways with an R7-million 
golden handshake (Evans 2019). 
The city council appointed chief audit executive Moeketsi Ntsimane as the acting city manager; 
however, the ANC was heavily criticized for it infringed on the independent and objective 
function of the internal auditing (Mahlokwane, 2019). With only serving three months as acting 
city manager, Ntsimane was removed. After his removal by the council, Ntsimane complained 
about the interference and undue influence of high profile-politicians on the city's 
administration while not mentioning any names. He further suggested that mixing politics with 
administrative functions cripples and compromises servery delivery (Moatshe, 2019). The 
political leadership crisis was further exacerbated when Mayor Steven Mokgalapa was 
removed through a motion of no confidence by the ANC. Thus currently, the metro is under 
the leadership of acting mayor Abel Tau and acting city manager Makgorometje Makgata. The 
issue of the removal of Major Steven Mokgalapa has been sent to the courts to preside. 
 
3.5.4 Johannesburg Metro 
The political and administrative relations between the Johannesburg metro are good. Since the 
election of Herman Mashaba and the appointment of Dr. Ndivhoniswani Lukhwareni as city 
manager, the metro has enjoyed a term of good governance and improved service delivery. 
However, this does not mean the metro was not scandal-free: the mayor was alleged to have 
unduly used his influence in a multimillion-rand contract to an NGO (Field Band Foundation) 
that he once chaired (Koko 2019); also according to Amabhungane, the EFF was given the 
patronage of lucrative city tenders as a 'quid pro quo for the DA-EFF coalition, this includes as 
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billion rand fleet management deal to a company that makes payment to the EFF (Reddy and 
Brümmer 2018).  
Internal Democratic Alliance politics that lead to the election of Dr. Hellen Zille as the federal 
chairperson has led to the resignation of party leader Mr. Mmusi Maimane and Johannesburg 
metro mayor Herman Mashaba. The impact of these resignations, especially the one of Herman 
Mashaba, opened space for the ANC to take control over the metro successfully; after three 
unsuccessful notions of no confidence in the mayor (Cilliers 2019). The taking control occurred 
when two DA councilors voted with the ANC; stating that "the return of Helen Zille made the 
part more antagonist to redress" (Feketha 2019).  
While the political relationship between the EFF and the DA in the metro remains intact, the 
change in relations between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC was also crucial in Geoff 
Makhubo's election as mayor. As Black (2010) correctly indicated, post-election coalitions are 
primarily unstable, are like increasing underhand dealings, corruption, and maladministration, 
for politicians are primarily obsessed with gaining access to resources and power. City manager 
Dr. Lukhwareni will likely be axed very soon, based on not being politically suitable.   
3.6 CONCLUSION  
 This chapter aimed to explore and enhance our understanding of the complex nature of the 
political bureaucracy, the practices of politicization of the bureaucracy, and its impact on the 
local government sphere's functioning. Thus, this chapter has discussed political parties' 
practices, mainly the African National Congress, in politicizing municipal managers' 
appointments and functions. The chapter has presented an argument for the causes and reasons 
for the politicizations. Part of the reasons provided for the politicization of appointments is a 
quest for the legitimacy and hegemony on municipalities, and also intra-party politics and 
contestations are also a leading factor in the politicization of municipal managers.  
This chapter further discussed literature on the current development of the metros, especially 
coalition governments, and the impact of the administration's changes. Thus, the need to have 
politically responsive administrators increases, especially in the coalition or political 
cooperation metros. The impact of these coalitions, whenever they are changes in political 
leadership, contributes to municipalities' administrative instability, especially with the 
dismissals of municipal managers and CFO's. 
 It is important to note that stable coalitions can build; the metros' development provides lessons 
to draw from for the next local government elections. The increase in coalition governments 
also increases the politicization of the appointment of municipal and senior managers. 
Therefore, the appointment of municipal managers as a reward for their political support 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter introduced and discussed the various theories on political-bureaucratic 
relations and the practices of politicization and political control through the lens of the theories 
which this study used. The chapter also mentioned that due to the increasing criticism on the 
involvement of political parties or politicians in the bureaucracy's appointment and function, 
any form of political control is considered undue pressure to suppress the bureaucracy's 
neutrality and effectiveness. In line with the theoretical underpinnings from the previous 
chapter, this chapter presents the research process outline.  
Thus, the chapter provides an in-depth account of the research methodology used in conducting 
this research and the rationale for using the chosen research method. It also discusses the 
research design and approach, data collection process, and the means to analyze the data; and 
ends with discussing the limitations of the study.  
 
4.2 Research Methodology  
 
McMillian and Schumacher (2010) provide a very general characterization of research, which 
includes developing methods of investigating a research problem consisting of processes that 
are well planned to collect and analyze data to answer the research questions. Creswell (2008) 
asserts that a research methodology's fundamental role is to be a strategy of inquiry, and such 
a strategy is supported by the research design, data collection, and data analysis. The purpose 
of the research methodology is to solve the research problem systematically, and as such 
researcher uses either a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-research method (Kothari 2004:7). 
The overall purpose of a research methodology is to describe how the researcher collects and 
analyses data. 
 
This study explored the methods used by political parties in politicizing and exercising political 
control over municipal managers; the purpose of the study was also to understand the rationale 
of political parties to politicize the bureaucracy and further explore the perceived impact of 
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politicization on the effectiveness and efficiency on the local government sphere. In accordance 
with the research objectives and the research questions, qualitative research was used.  
      
4.2.1 Justification for the use of Qualitative Research  
  
Van Deventer (2013) proclaims that qualitative research allows the researcher to understand 
and describe people and institutions' behavior in the social settings and the theoretical 
assumptions used in the study. A qualitative study also looks at relationships without 
necessarily making predictions about them, and most of the data collected are in the form of 
words. According to Bowen et al. (2017), social scientists have become accustomed to using 
qualitative research to explain and describe the experience, thoughts, feelings, and behavior of 
people.  
 
 Kumar (2011) provides a simplistic definition of qualitative research as an approach "to 
understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, 
values, beliefs, and experiences of a group of people" (Kumar 2011:104). Such a definition is 
supported by Du Plooy-Collier et al. (2014:14), who suggest that the qualitative research 
methodology helps the researcher and reader understand, explain, and describe people's 
behavior and what informs such behavior. The qualitative research was chosen because it 
enabled the study to better understand and interpret political parties' behavior in politicizing 
the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats' behavior towards political parties and the political 
government. 
 
Qualitative research is not the only research approach; quantitative research is mainly used by 
natural scientists and is based on measuring and classifying information on numeracy and 
statics (Kumar 2011:104); the collected data is analyzed in the form of numbers (Walliman 
2017:113). For this study to achieve its objectives, researchers use either one of the systematic 
research approaches, and as such, this study used the qualitative research approach. The study 
viewed the qualitative approach as best due to the sensitivity of the topic, and while  
Creswell (2008) acknowledged that qualitative research has several differing knowledge, 
methods used for inquiry, data collection techniques which include primary data(observations, 
surveys, and interviews, etc.) and secondary data (books, journals, newspapers, etc.), and 
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Langos (2014) also noted that qualitative research's success is heavily reliant on the researcher's 
skills, the availability of information, and the research's ability to avoid any form of biases. 
This study used a desktop research approach relying on the existing data on the political parties' 
politicization and political control and the nature of the political-bureaucratic relations. The 
study also explored the correlation between politicization and municipal performance, the 
outcomes of the research are not based on any of the researcher's judgment or interpretations, 
and as such, the study used both the descriptive and explorative approaches.    
 
4.3 Research Approach and Design 
 
One of the fundamental roles of a research approach and design is to ensure that research has 
clear aims and objectives aligned with how the data will be collected and how the data will be 
analyzed. The research approach and design are considered as the blueprint of the research that 
assists in preventing the researcher from derailing from the aims and objectives; it illustrates 
how the research will be conducted and enables the research to answer the research questions, 
and also consider the limitation of the study (Babbie and Mouton 2011:74).  
 
The research design is based on the research problem and the research questions outlined in 
the first chapter, and it is the glue that holds the study and links all the phases of the study 
together. Kumar (2011) concludes that research design has two functions: to identify and 
develop the procedures required to do a study and ensure the quality of these procedures for 
the study's validity, objectivity, and accuracy.  
 
As mentioned, the qualitative research approach used in this study was a desktop approach that 
relied on secondary data to seek accurate information on the topic: the secondary consisted of 
the historical background and theoretical principles and literature from published and 
unpublished data. Such data consisted of government reports and legislation, journal articles, 
books, newspaper, and unpublished data such as dissertations and theses. These recorded and 
interpreted data assisted in better understanding the politicization and the political-bureaucratic 
relationship within the local government sphere.  
This perspective is supported by Denzin and Lincoln (2005) when they suggest that the use of 
secondary data assists the researcher in making sense of or interpret the behavior of people in 
natural settings and what causes such behavior. Based on political parties' definition in the 
previous chapter, this study views politicization as a human behavior by a legal person (the 
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political party). The research also used the descriptive and the exploratory approach to better 
the politicization of the bureaucracy and the nature of the political-bureaucratic relations.  
 
4.3.1. Descriptive Approach 
 
As social sciences are considered the 'science of society' that is about investigating and seeking 
to answer unexplained human behavior individually or in cooperative associations. Most social 
scientists use qualitative research; furthermore, most practice the qualitative exploratory and 
descriptive approach, and while some use the quantitative or the mixed-research also use the 
explanatory approach. This study's main objective is to understand the politicization of the 
bureaucracy by political parties and explore the theoretical perspectives on political-
bureaucratic relations and challenges in the local government sphere linked to the politicization 
of the bureaucracy.  
 
The study must use both descriptive and exploratory approaches. Meyer and Rigsby (2001) 
conclude that the descriptive approach allows the readers to understand the research problem's 
nature and impact. Nassaji (2015) argued that qualitative research must describe a phenomenon 
and its characteristics; as such, the study described the behavior of political parties in the 
politicization of the local government bureaucracy and how the politicization impacts the 
political-bureaucratic relations. 
 
In describing the features of politicization and the methods applied to gain political control 
over the bureaucracy, the study hopes to better understand the phenomenon. Thus, the 
descriptive approach is concerned with describing both how and why political parties politicize 
the bureaucracy and what they intend to achieve with politicization. Therefore, this study 
described the nature and methods used on the politicization of the bureaucracy through the 
collected data. 
     
4.3.2 Exploratory Approach  
 
It is important to note that the exploratory research approach uses either primary or secondary 
data. The focus of such an approach on what questions:  
• what are the reasons for the politicization and political control of the bureaucracy by 
political parties,  
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• what are the challenges faced by municipalities that are linked to the practice of 
politicization, and, 
• what are theoretical perspectives on political-bureaucratic relations?  
 
The use of the exploratory research approach is aimed chiefly at providing new explanations 
and a new angle to a matter that has been previously researched (Reiter 2017:143). Numerous 
studies have looked at the political control of political parties on the political government in 
South Africa. However, very few have focused specifically on the local government sphere, let 
alone on the bureaucracy's politicization and political control in this study.  
 
With the use of the key concepts, theories on political parties and political-bureaucratic 
relations, and the literature on the South African local government sphere, the study explored 
the practices on politicization and its links to the sphere's challenges. The research explains the 
forth-back interactions between theory and reality on politicization to try to make better sense 
of the phenomenon. Thus, the study focuses on the linkages between the nature of political-
bureaucratic relations and the efficiency of municipalities.  
 
4.4 Data Collection   
 
Several instruments a researcher can use to collect data; can be through documents (academic 
and non-academic), interviews, surveys, questionnaires, observations, etc. (Halcomb 2016:6). 
As already mentioned in the chapter, the primary source of information in this study is 
secondary data; thus, the study used the existing data to answer the research questions and 
achieve the objectives. The secondary data and theoretical underpinnings of Political-
Bureaucratic Relations theories have been applied to the presently ongoing processes of 
politicizing the bureaucracy in the South African local government sphere. The study relied on 
secondary data related to political parties' politicization and political control and the impact of 
such practices on the local government sphere. Given the challenges of the available data on 
the involvement or role of political parties in the bureaucracy's politicization and political 
control, this study is both descriptive and explorative.  
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Alhojailan ( 2012) defines data analysis as a systemic process to give meaning or interpret the 
collected data concerning the research problem. Data analysis is central to any study for it is 
the process of analyzing the collected data; for this study, the collected secondary data on 
politicization and political, bureaucratic relations in the local government sphere, mainly the 
metro municipalities, will be subject to the data analysis methods.  
Shanthi et al. (2017) suggest that there several methods that can be used to analyze qualitative 
data: it can be narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, case study, generic 
approach, constructivism, feminist, content analysis, narrative analysis, thematic analysis, 
postmodernism, or mixed methods. The analyzed secondary data were to identify, describe and 
explore the relationship between poor municipal performances, challenges of rampant 
corruption and maladministration, and the impact of politicization on the local government 
sphere; and determine the need to find an ideal model for South Africa. 
 
 To bring the theoretical underpinning and political parties' practices in the politicization of the 
bureaucracy, the content analysis approach was viewed as a valuable and suitable method to 
analyze the data. Elo and Kyngas (2007) advocate that through content analysis, the researcher 
can describe a phenomenon to test theoretical issues around the phenomena to obtain a better 
understanding and assist in providing new insights on the phenomena.  
 
These scholars further acknowledge that content analysis can be either qualitative or 
quantitative, deductive or inductive (Elo and Kyngas 2007:109). This study used a qualitative 
deductive approach. The deductive approach begins from a general to the specific; the general 
is a theoretical framework on politicization and political-bureaucratic relations and the specific 
on the practices of politicization and political control over the bureaucracy within the South 
African local government sphere.  
 
Such an approach allowed the researcher to use existing literature and find common ground 
concerning the understanding and perceptions of political-bureaucratic relations and explain 
the nature of politicization and politics on the bureaucracy and its impact on efficiency and 
effectiveness of the local government sphere. Thus, through the content analysis, the study was 
able to detect, identify, and explain politicization practices consistent with the theory on 
political-bureaucratic relations. The different theories on political bureaucratic and the critical 
concepts defined; the examined case of politicization of the municipal managers in the South 
African local government sphere.  
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4.6 Discussion of Findings 
4.6.1 Nature of Political-Bureaucratic Relations  
• Across South Africa, it is political parties that lead to the politicization of the 
bureaucracy. The Democratic Alliance, while practicing the politicization of the 
bureaucracy, primarily considers people that are politically suitable with the relevant 
qualifications. This is not always the case in African National Congress lead 
municipalities, for political or factional loyal is prioritized before qualifications. 
• Whenever there are changes in the political administration, especially during elections, 
this also means a change in the bureaucracy, clearly indicating that there is a distrust in 
municipal managers from a previous administration; significantly, if the previous 
administration was led by a different political party or a different faction with the same 
political party. Therefore, the dismissals, recruitment, and functioning of the senior 
managers in municipalities are subject to politics.  
• The Politicized-bureaucracy model is prevalent in the local government, with a few 
municipalities using the Complementary and Collaborative Model.  
     
4.6.2 Performance of Municipalities affected by politicization  
• In most municipalities where the Politicized-Bureaucracy Model has used, these 
municipalities are linked with the challenges of service delivery backlogs, leadership 
and governance failures, corruption and fraud, poor financial management, and poor 
performance management. 
• Most municipal managers view the involvement of political parties as a threat and 
intimidation to their function, which negatively impacts their performance; in metros 
where there is no political party with a clear majority. The majority party is plagued 
with external factional problems; municipal and senior managers' dismissal increases 
due to forever changing political dynamics in the municipal council. 
 
4.6.3 Political killings linked with the politicization  
• Since the politicization of the bureaucracy is linked with political party internal 
fighting, managers' employment is also a reward for those loyal to the political party, 
faction, or private sector interest. Senior municipal managers experience threats, 




52 | P a g e  
 
4.7 Limitations of the Study 
Part of the limitation of this study is the desktop approach on the politicization and political 
control by political parties on municipal and senior managers' appointments and functioning. 
Thus, the reliance on secondary data, such as newspapers, books, journal articles, unpublished 
data, and government reports, provided limited information on the extent and intensity of 
politicization practices. An empirical approach through the use of interviews and 
questionnaires would have enhanced the study. The empirical approach's exclusion was based 
on the matter's sensitivity, especially with the increasing political killings of political leaders, 
councilors, and senior municipal officials. Due to the safety of the researcher and the potential 
research participants, the desktop approach was referred. However, further research around the 




This chapter has extensively discussed the research methodology and the research approach 
and design that complements the data collection and data analysis. The study uses the 
qualitative research method to inquire about the bureaucracy's politicization in the South 
African local government sphere. The research used secondary data as the primary source of 
information and used the deductive content analysis approach to analyze the secondary data. 
In conclusion, throughout the chapter, the researcher has flagged the limitations of the study, 


























CHAPTER 5:  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This concluding chapter reviews the study's primary objective to explore political parties' 
involvement in municipal managers' appointments and how political parties or key politicians 
interfere in municipal managers' functions. This chapter provides the summary and 
recommendations that municipalities or the whole local government sphere can limit the 
negative impact of politicization or establish a politically neutral bureaucracy that is responsive 
to the political imperatives of the political parties based on the party manifesto. The study's 
primary objectives were to explore the extent to which politicization and political control affect 
municipalities' functioning and effectiveness and make recommendations to this effect. Finally, 
this chapter revisits the long-standing debate on the political sciences' field on the relationship 
between political parties, the political government, and bureaucrats in light of the conclusions.  
 
5.2 SUMMARY  
 
One chapter provided the background, objectives, and rationale for the study focusing on 
political parties' involvement in municipal managers' appointment and function. The chapter 
also describes and explains the purpose, significance, research problem, and research questions 
and provides in-depth literature on the historical background for developing the local 
government sphere as part of the foundation of the study. 
The second chapter provided a theoretical framework for the study that provided an 
understanding of political-bureaucratic relations and the bureaucracy's politicization. The 
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chapter consisted of three theories which deal with the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats; and political parties and government. The dichotomous political-bureaucratic 
relationship theory calls for a separate relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and it 
centered on the depoliticized, neutrality, and professionalism of bureaucrats. In contrast, the 
inseparable-relationship theory is centered on the politicized relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats. The politicized relationship can be either through the use of the 
complementary or collaborative model; besides, the principal-agent theory for a multi-
dimensional understanding of political control exercised by the political agents.  
Chapter three focused on the research methodology and research design for the study. The 
discussed the research method that the study would use to collect and analyze the collected 
secondary data on the involvement of political parties in the municipal manager appointments 
and functioning politicization. This chapter's objectives were to find a linkage between the 
objectives, the theoretical framework, the existing literature, and data, thereby exploring the 
nature of politicization and political control by political parties in South Africa. Lastly, the 
chapter described and explained the limitations of the study.  
 
The fourth chapter explored the reasons and causes for the municipal manager appointments 
and functions; the chapter also discussed political parties' practices in politicizing the 
bureaucracy, especially by the African National Congress. The chapter also discussed the 
legislative guidelines for municipal managers' appointments and municipal councils' role in the 
appointments. Furthermore, the chapter has also looked at the challenges within the local 
government sphere linked with municipal managers' politicization and political control, 
especially municipal managers' appointments with the necessary qualifications and experience. 
The chapter concluded by exploring the impact of the recent political changes in the metro on 
municipal managers' appointments and function; the section also looks at individual politicians' 
roles, such as mayors.  
The fifth and concluding chapter summaries the study and specifically outline the problem 
areas with the politicization and political control of municipal manager and recommendations 
to limit the problems with associated with politicization and also establish a model that 
increases the quality of service delivery and function of municipal managers; while also 
increasing their political responsiveness. The following section presents the problem areas and 
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5.3 OUTLINE OF CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The outline of the challenges that affect the local government sphere in South Africa that is 
linked with the politicization and the politicized political-bureaucratic relations were 
determined throughout this study as follows:  
• The study established that worldwide that that practices of politicization and attempts 
to establish are negatively perceived, and challenges in the government are argued to 
be caused by politicization; the South African local government sphere's case is no 
different. The challenge of having municipal managers that are appointment without 
possessing the necessary skills, qualifications, and experience.  
• The study highlighted that the cadre deployment practices of the African National 
Congress is the most criticized and has been linked with the following administrative 
challenges within the local government sphere: the apparent lack of distinction between 
the operation function between politicians and administrators, due to the political 
involvement of political parties to such an extent in some municipalities that municipal 
managers receive the mandate directly from the regional structures of political parties; 
there are rampant corruption and maladministration, service delivery backlogs and 
violent protests; governance and administration failures; poor financial management 
and the incapacity of municipalities to financially sustain themselves; political 
infighting within municipal councils that directly affect the function of municipal 
managers; 
➢ The politicizations promote municipal managers to fail to comply with the regulations 
due to the political influence, especially in the appointment of service providers that are 
politically favored. 
➢ The appointment and function of municipal managers are also subject to the internal 
politics of political parties. In a coalition or political cooperation municipality, they are 
subject to the winning coalition's political interest, and any changes are likely to lead 
to suspension of municipal managers if they are not politically suitable. 
➢ The study also found that even individual politicians, specifically mayors, also 
politicized municipal managers' appointment and function for their private and political 
interests. Furthermore, the politicization also extends to directors and junior staff within 
municipalities. Recommendations to overcome some of these challenges need to be 
made.  
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Drawing from the literature on the politicization of the bureaucracy as well as theories on 
political-bureaucracy relations, this study makes the following recommendations:  
Ø There is a long-standing debate within the political sciences and public administration, with 
one side calling for the neutrality of the bureaucracy and the other side calling for the 
bureaucracy's politicization. Since the bureaucracy is a creation of politics, the practice of 
politicizing the appointment and function of municipal managers falls under the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Inseparable Political-Bureaucratic Relations Theory. Furthermore, the 
study highlighted that political parties' practices seek to create a politicized and collaborative 
bureaucracy instead of a complementary bureaucracy.  
An ideal recommendation would be to suggest a complete separation of the bureaucracy from 
politics, but such a recommendation will not receive support from political parties. It would be 
challenging to ensure that all appointments are politically neutral or to ensure that there is no 
political interference in municipal managers' function, especially in this current juncture of 
developing the local government sphere and South African politics in general.  
Instead, the recommendation is for municipal councils to use either the depoliticized 
bureaucracy approach and allow municipal managers to run municipal based on the 
administrative capacities or if they see the need to politicize the appointment and function to 
use the complementary bureaucracy model. All the appointment of the municipal managers 
must meet the legislative guidelines in meeting the requirements for appointments. The 
managers' competency should be highly prioritized; then, political suitability can be taken into 
account. Most importantly, the performance agreements should outline the key targets of the 
elections manifesto that must be turned into municipal programmes and policies to create an 
interdependent, distinct, and complementary relationship between politicians and bureaucracy.  
Furthermore, no external political party structures may directly liaise with the municipal 
manager. The political party needs to recommend or give the mandate to any functioning; it 
should be done through its party members within the municipal council or municipal executive. 
Thus, in terms of appointments, the municipal council members may only recommend people 
who meet the minimum requirements.     
Ø It should be legislated that even at branch-level, political parties should declare donations 
given to the political party, even donations made during the internal political party contests. 
The donors were mainly rewarded through government contracts, and thus, municipal 
managers are instructed on whom to support. Thus, on any contractor is suspicious, it should 
be viewed if the contractor is awarded not as a reward but because the contractor was appointed 
in the public interest.  
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Ø Any person who applies for a municipal manager position should declare any pending cases 
against him or her from previous employment. If the municipal council chooses that person to 
be a municipal manager, a letter of motivation from the municipal council must be sent for the 
MEC of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to note and approve.   
5.3.2 Recommendations for future research 
 
Further research into the topic is highly recommended since the study employed desktop 
qualitatively relied on secondary data, and the limitations were noted in the study. Therefore, 
more scholarly interest in this field of research should be pursued; with the use of empirical 
data collection methods such as interviews, surveys, and focus group discussions. These 
approaches will be more suitable since there is a growing bulk of literature being published. 
Furthermore, also the study focused on the local government sphere only on the politicization 
of municipal manager post and with the recent development around state capture in the country; 
several areas can be looked into, including the appointment of board members into State-
Owned-Enterprises, the appointment of Judges, the senior government of officials, etc. 
Such empirical research regarding the nature and extent of the bureaucracy's politicization and 
who most benefits from such practices would be of great importance to look into; and how 
service delivery and development are affected. Moreover, further research is required on 
political parties and municipal councils to address the facing the local government sphere and 
meet the people's needs. Finally, more research is required on bureaucratic political relations 
and the search for an ideal model that will complement service delivery and efficiency while 
creating a complementary relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.  
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
This study has discussed the nature of politicization and political control practiced by political 
parties on municipal managers and the challenges on the local government sphere linked with 
politicization. The study has also demonstrated that there is a closed connection with reasons 
such as gaining access to power, the need to increase hegemony and political dominance, and 
surviving internal political party battles, and rewarding members for their support in the 
appointment of municipal managers and other municipal positions. Furthermore, the study has 
forward several recommendations to limit the negative impacts of politicization and improve 
the local government sphere's efficiency and effectiveness and the recommendation for the 
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future researcher. To address the challenges of patronage politics, rent-seeking, corruption, 
clientelism, gatekeeping, neo-patrimonialism, and cronyism within South African politics and 
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